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State and local funds are currently inadequate for completely securing local infrastructures. 
This thesis poses a solution to the funding issues by looking at the problem from two 
perspectives: risk assessment methodology and civic involvement. Risk assessment 
reduces the need for funding by funding the highest risk return on investment assets only. 
It is the foundation for determining the funding and resources required for hazard 
mitigation; however, the current risk methodology used by the Department of Homeland 
Security, Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment, is flawed because it lacks 
adequate rigor and does not incorporate a major goal in measuring effectiveness—return 
on investment.  
Citizen involvement may provide an alternative source of funding through 
crowdsourcing, rather than taxation. Involving citizens in making decisions about 
resources and raising capital for security measures provides a viable alternative to federal 
funding and supports public desire to play a role against terrorism. But in order to make 
such a shift in expectations attainable, citizens must have the trust and transparency that is 
fostered through accurate assessments, communication, engagement, and reporting.  
This thesis evaluates the current risk methodology and its shortcomings and 
proposes a more rigorous approach based on in-depth, holistic risk analysis to reduce 
vulnerabilities within a vast network of critical infrastructure assets, and proposes 
crowdsourcing, crowdfunding, and bonding as alternatives to traditional federal 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. CURRENT STATE OF DHS’ RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ......1 
A. CURRENT DHS RISK APPROACH ......................................................1 
B. SIMPLE RISK ...........................................................................................2 
C. ACCEPTANCE OF A SIMPLE RISK FORMULA...............................3 
D. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH RISK VARIABLES: 
VULNERABILITY ....................................................................................4 
1. Assessing Vulnerability: Population Density Is Not a Sufficient 
Measure ...........................................................................................4 
2. Accounting for New Security Measures in the Vulnerability 
Calculation ......................................................................................5 
3. FEMA Makes Little Progress Calculating Vulnerability ...........6 
4. The Need to Refine Vulnerability .................................................7 
E. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH RISK VARIABLES: THREAT AND 
CONSEQUENCE .......................................................................................8 
1. The Need to Question Threat and Consequences .......................9 
2. Controversy of Risk Analysis Model ............................................9 
F. OTHER EXPERT OPINIONS ...............................................................10 
G. LACK OF AN ROI STRATEGY ...........................................................13 
H. MAKING A HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY WORK, 
STARTING WITH THE END-CONSUMER—THE PUBLIC ..........14 
I. FUTURE FUNDING STRATEGIES .....................................................14 
J. THESIS STATEMENT ...........................................................................15 
K. CLAIM AND RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................15 
L. OVERVIEW OF REMAINING CHAPTERS ......................................15 
II. FEMA’S NEW MEASURE OF SUCCESS—BUILDING CAPABILITIES .19 
A. JUSTIFYING CAPABILITIES SPENDING THROUGH THIRA ....20 
B. THIRA’S ROI QUESTIONED ...............................................................24 
C. THE PRACTICALITY OF CAPABILITIES-BUILDING .................26 
D. ROI ANALYSIS—THREAT, VULNERABILITY, AND 
CONSEQUENCE .....................................................................................30 
III. HOW TO CALCULATE DHS’ ROI IN RESPONSE TO THE BOSTON 
MARATHON BOMBINGS ................................................................................33 
A. DHS’S ROI ...............................................................................................33 
1. FEMA’s ROI: A Collective Response ........................................34 
2. FEMA’s ROI: Sources of HSGPs ...............................................36 
a. Resources ...........................................................................36 
b. Training, Exercises, and Technical Assistance ...............37 
c. FEMA’s ROI: Boston’s 2012 THIRA Identified the 
Potential Threat.................................................................39 
d. FEMA’s ROI: Appropriate Incident Response ...............39 
B. CAPABILITIES-BUILDING—AN ROI CALCULATION ................41 
 vii 
1. Measuring an ROI Alongside Boston’s Luck-Factor ...............42 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE ROI STRATEGY: MODEL-BASED RISK 
ASSESSMENT .....................................................................................................47 
A. DEFINITION OF ROI ............................................................................47 
B. UTILIZING FAULT TREE ANALYSIS WITHIN MBRA ................50 
C. SHORT-TERM STRATEGY EXAMPLE: PREVENTATIVE 
SECURITY AND PLANNED SPECIAL EVENTS .............................51 
D. ROI ASSESSMENT FOR PREVENTATIVE SECURITY .................53 
E. LONG-TERM STRATEGY EXAMPLE: POWER LINES AND 
NATURAL DISASTERS ........................................................................54 
F. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................56 
V. THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTMENT: INFORMED 
DECISION-MAKING BY THE PUBLIC .........................................................59 
A. CROWDFUNDING .................................................................................60 
1. Examples in Homeland Security.................................................63 
B. BONDS ......................................................................................................66 
C. WHY CROWDFUNDING/BONDING WILL WORK ........................67 
1. Myth1: Education Changes Behavior ........................................68 
2. Myth 2: Attitude Changes Behavior ..........................................69 
3. Myth 3: People Know What Motivates Them to Take Action.69 
4. Historical Perspective on Homeland Security Investments .....70 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................73 
1. Informed Culture .........................................................................74 
2. Reporting Culture ........................................................................75 
3. Just Culture ..................................................................................76 
APPENDIX.  CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS AS DEFINED BY 
DHS .......................................................................................................................77 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................79 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The Five-Step THIRA Process ..................................................................21 
Figure 2. WMATA Rail Map ....................................................................................49 
Figure 3. Boston Marathon Route Fault Tree............................................................52 
Figure 4. Sow the Seeds of Victory ...........................................................................71 
 
 ix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Core Capabilities by Mission Area ............................................................19 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACE Atlantic City Electric 
BPHC Boston Public Health Commission 
BPU Bureau of Public Utilities 
BRIC Boston Regional Intelligence Center  
C consequence 
CDC Center for Disease Control 
CDP Center for Domestic Preparedness 
CPG Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DIB defense industrial base 
DOT Department of Transportation 
EOC Emergency Operations Center 
EMS Emergency Medical Services 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FPS Federal Protective Service 
FTA fault tree analysis 
GAO Government Accounting Office 
GOAL National Preparedness Goal 
HAZMAT hazardous materials 
HIV high-interest vessel 
HPFF high-pressure fluid-filled 
HPGF high-pressure gas-filled 
HSGP Homeland Security Grant Program 
HSPD-7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 
ICS Incident Command System 
IED improvised explosive device 
IMAT Incident Management Assistance Team 
 xiii 
IRS Internal Revenue Service 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
JCP&L Jersey Central Power and Light 
JOBS Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
JTTF joint terrorism task force 
L likelihood 
MBHSR Metro Boston Homeland Security Region 
MBRA model based risk assessment 
MCI mass casualty incident 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MPD Metropolitan Police Department 
NCR National Capital Region 
NDPC National Domestic Preparedness Consortium 
NIMS National Incident Management System 
NPPD National Protection and Programs Directorate 
NPS  National Preparedness System 
NRF National Response Framework 
NWC National Watch Center 
OIG Office of Inspector General 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
OEC Office of Emergency Communications 
PPD-8 Presidential Policy Directive 8 
PSA protective security advisor 
PSE&G Public Service Electric and Gas 
PSGP Port Security Grant Program 
RCCP Regional Catastrophic Coordination Plan 
RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center 
RICCS Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System 
ROI return on investment 
SCFF self-contained fluid-filled 
SEAR special events assessment rating 
SEWG Special Events Working Group 
 xiv 
SHSP State Homeland Security Program 
SNRA strategic national risk assessment 
T threat 
TARP Threat Awareness and Reporting Program 
THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment 
TSA Transportation Security Administration 
UASI Urban Area Security Initiative 
V vulnerability 
WAWAS Washington Area Warning and Alert System 
WebEOC Web Emergency Operations Center 
WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 












I would like to say THANK YOU to my wife, Preeti; my daughter, Priya; and my 
son, Max, who have patiently afforded me the time to participate in the Center for 
Homeland Security and Defense master’s program. The earlier mornings at the kitchen 
counter writing and the time away attending classes could not have been done without the 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 xviii 
I. CURRENT STATE OF DHS’ RISK ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGY 
The Government Accounting Office (GAO), the National Research Council, the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), and various risk experts have disputed the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) risk assessment methodology, utilized for 
allocating the $16.3 billion of State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) grants since 2003. GAO questions the analysis and calculations 
associated with the methodology.1 The National Research Council believes that a group of 
outside experts needs to take an unbiased look at the DHS grant allocation formulas. CRS 
has provided numerous studies, which question both the DHS risk methodology and grant 
allocation formulas. Finally, other experts, such as John Mueller, Mark G. Stewart, and 
Greg F. Treverton, believe that America needs to examine massive homeland security 
expenditures by applying analytical risk management approaches that emphasize cost-
benefit analysis and determinations of acceptable and unacceptable risks when developing 
regulations and future funding approaches.2 
A. CURRENT DHS RISK APPROACH  
If DHS is to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.,3 one of its primary statutory 
missions, it needs to assess risk in an accurate manner. The DHS risk analysis model 
includes empirical risk analysis and policy judgments. The vulnerability element of the risk 
analysis model has limitations that reduce its value.4 Measuring vulnerability is considered 
a generally accepted practice in assessing risk; however, the DHS risk analysis model does 
not measure vulnerability for each state and urban area.5 Rather, DHS considers all states 
1 Government Accounting Office, DHS Risk-Based Grant Methodology is Responsible, but Current 
Version’s Measure of Vulnerability is Limited (GAO-08-852) (Washington, DC: Government Accounting 
Office, 2008), abstract. 
2 John Mueller, and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and 
Costs of Homeland Security (Ohio State University, Columbus OH, 2011), abstract. 
3 See P.L. 107–296, § 101, codified at 6 U.S.C. §111. 
4 Government Accounting Office, DHS Risk-Based Grant Methodology, abstract. 
5 Ibid. 
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and urban areas equally vulnerable to a successful attack, and it does not take into account 
any geographic differences.6 Thus, as a practical matter, the final risk scores are determined 
by the threat and consequences scores,7 which have also been disputed. 
B. SIMPLE RISK 
Before discussing the issues associated with the DHS risk assessment methodology, 
one must have a basic understanding of simple risk. Simple risk8 (R) can be defined as the 
product of likelihood (L) times consequence (C). Likelihood is defined as the probability 
of an event, incident, or attack, which can also be defined as the likelihood of a fault, and 
is depicted by the Greek symbol gamma (γ). Assuming there are multiple assets affected 
by the attack or incident, each asset is numbered and depicted by its numerical index (i). 
Therefore, γi represents the likelihood that asset i will suffer damages from some hazard. 
 ri = γiCi Eq. 1 
Likelihood and consequence have little meaning without a target and a threat. An 
estimate of likelihood and consequence is relative to the asset and the threat and is often 
referred to as the asset/threat pair. Once the asset and threat are known, estimates of the 
likelihood and consequence make sense. When more than one asset/threat pair exists, 
aggregate risk is the sum of the risk of the individual asset/threat pairs. 
 R = Ʃ (γiCi) = r1 + r2… + rn Eq. 2 
Aggregate risk is the expected loss across all asset/risk pairs. This model assumes 
that threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences are independent of one another. That is, 
threat is not affected by vulnerability, and consequence is not affected by threat or 
vulnerability. 
Risk may also be the sum of multiple risks to a single asset. Assuming each threat 
is independent of all others and only one incident at a time occurs, one can aggregate simple 
risk across all threats by summation. There is an assumption that threats are independent 
and that there is no correlation between attack types. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ted Lewis, “Simple Risk,” course lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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But what is the risk formula when intent is a factor in the equation? Let threat (Ti) 
be the probability of an attack.9 Specifically, threat is the probability that an attack will be 
attempted but does not include the probability that the attack will be successful. This is the 
job of vulnerability (Vi). Vulnerability is the conditional probability that an attack or hazard 
will succeed if attempted. It describes the condition of the asset, while threat describes the 
intent. Consequence is defined as the damage caused by the event and can be measured in 
units of lives, dollars, or time. Risk is in the same units as consequence. Therefore, if 
consequence is in dollars, risk is as well. 
 ri = Ti x Vi x Ci Eq. 3 
Each of the elements of risk is difficult to estimate. Threat may be estimated by 
experts or deduced by intelligence analysis. Vulnerability and consequence maybe 
similarly obtained from experts or historical data. Nonetheless, estimating probability and 
damages is a challenge when applying simple risk analysis. Other methods of estimation, 
such as modeling and simulation, are used to obtain estimates of these elements (Ti, Vi, and 
Ci) by simulating the infrastructure system or situation. Game theory may also be used to 
estimate threat and vulnerability assuming the attacker maximizes risk, while the defender 
minimizes risk. 
In summary, for the remainder of this thesis, risk will be defined as the simple 
product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence (represented in Eq. 4). 
 ri = Ti x Vi x Ci Eq. 4 
C. ACCEPTANCE OF A SIMPLE RISK FORMULA 
With an understanding of simple risk, one can understand why Congress, the 
president, and the Secretary of Homeland Security have endorsed risk management as a 
way to direct finite financial resources to areas that are most at risk of terrorist attacks.10 
Risk management is a continuous process that includes the assessment of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences to determine what actions should be taken to reduce one 
9 Ibid. 
10 Government Accounting Office, Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management, 
and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened (GAO-12-47) (Washington, DC: Government 
Accounting Office, 2011), 8. 
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or more of these elements of risk.11 DHS has applied risk management principles to the 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) through the use of a risk model to assess the 
relative risk posed to entities throughout the nation (e.g., states, urban areas, ports, mass 
transit systems) and to help determine eligibility and funding levels.12 Data for each of the 
risk variables are collected from offices and components throughout DHS, as well as from 
other data sources, and then, using the model, each entity is ranked against one another and 
assigned a relative risk score.13  
D. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH RISK VARIABLES: VULNERABILITY 
In June 2008, GAO reported that DHS chose to hold vulnerability constant and 
consider all states and urban areas equally vulnerable in the HSGP risk analysis model.14 
But how could Atlanta be as vulnerable to a terrorist attack as New York City or the 
National Capital Region15 (NCR)? GAO recommended that DHS formulate a method to 
measure vulnerability in a manner that captures variations across urban areas and states 
and apply this vulnerability measure in future iterations of the grant allocation model.16 
1. Assessing Vulnerability: Population Density Is Not a Sufficient 
Measure 
In response to these recommendations and other external feedback regarding the 




14 Ibid., 19. 
15 The National Capital Region (NCR) was created pursuant to the National Capital Planning Act of 
1952, 40 USC §71. The act defines the NCR as the District of Columbia; Montgomery and Prince George’s 
Counties in the state of Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William Counties in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia; and all cities existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area 
bounded by the outer boundaries of the combined area of said counties (e.g., Alexandria, Manassas, 
Manassas Park, Rockville). 
16 Government Accounting Office, Port Security Grant Program, 19. 
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2011 risk analysis model so that vulnerability is no longer held constant.17 Instead, the new 
vulnerability index recognizes that different entities can have different vulnerability 
levels18 by assessing counts of activities. For example, the vulnerability levels of passenger 
rail systems are prioritized utilizing the annualized number of passengers; the more 
passengers, the higher the vulnerability score. Such counts of activities do not allow for an 
actual vulnerabilities analysis of critical infrastructure but of the potential effects of a 
disruption to the infrastructure. In fact, if consequence is defined as the damage caused by 
an event and is measured in units of lives, dollars, or time, then the number of passengers 
utilizing a rail system is a factor to consider with consequence and not vulnerability. 
2. Accounting for New Security Measures in the Vulnerability 
Calculation 
The fiscal year 2011 vulnerability index also did not provide a mechanism to 
account for how new security measures—such as the installation of cameras or the 
provision of additional training to security officials—affect an entity’s vulnerability, even 
if those security measures were funded using grant dollars.19 This limitation was due to the 
fact that the data elements within the vulnerability index are counts of activities, which 
recognize the number of activities that may occur but do not account for the protective 
actions taken to secure them.20 For example, if an entity installed security cameras 
throughout a rail mass transit system to monitor passenger activity, one would expect to 
reduce the system’s vulnerability to attack. However, because the “transit passenger” data 
element within the model’s vulnerability index is simply a count of passengers utilizing 
the transit system and is not a reflection of the security measures in place to protect the 
17 DHS officials reported that the decision to incorporate a vulnerability component in the fiscal year 
2011 risk model was primarily based on feedback in the following three reports: (1) Government 
Accounting Office, DHS Risk-Based Grant Methodology; (2) National Research Council, Review of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: National Research 
Council, 2010); and (3) Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, FEMA GPD Risk Integration 
and Cost to Capability Analysis Final Report (Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Studies and Analysis 
Institute, 2010). 
18 Government Accounting Office, Port Security Grant Program, 19. 
19 Ibid., 20.  
20 Ibid. 
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transit system, the new camera system would not reduce the system’s vulnerability score 
as calculated by the risk analysis model. Thus, with this type of measure, a rail mass transit 
system could only reduce its vulnerability score by reducing the number of passengers 
utilizing the system.21 The risk model’s so-called robustness is thereby limited because 
activity counts do not reflect improvements made to security.22 
When questioned, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials 
reported that capturing such data on all security improvements would be challenging due 
to the need to collect and validate data for all entities included in the risk model.23 
However, FEMA officials also acknowledged the importance of incorporating completed 
security projects as part of the vulnerability component of the risk model and stated that 
FEMA will continue to refine its vulnerability assessments.24 Without accounting for the 
reductions in vulnerability achieved through new security measures implemented, 
including those funded through homeland security grants, the robustness of the risk model 
may be limited and not accurately reflect the relative risk of entities throughout the 
nation.25 Instead, the risk model would likely continue to recognize the same entities as the 
highest risk, regardless of the security improvements made. In addition, by not accounting 
for security improvements resulting from homeland security grants, the security benefits 
of the grants are also not recognized.26 Incorporating completed security projects into the 
vulnerability component of the risk model could help increase its robustness and more 
accurately direct allocations to the highest risk entities.27 
3. FEMA Makes Little Progress Calculating Vulnerability 
While FEMA officials said developing an improved vulnerability index that 
incorporates the effect of security improvements would be a challenging process, there are 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 






                                                 
interim measures FEMA could take to ensure the most precise data available are being used 
to populate the existing vulnerability index.28 An example of how FEMA has progressed 
in this regard is the modification to the hazmat population data component calculation in 
the fiscal year 2011 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) risk model.29 The hazardous 
materials passing through a port are just as important to consider in calculating the 
vulnerability and threat of the port as the hazardous materials destined for that port. Rather 
than measuring only hazardous materials imports, as was done in the fiscal year 2010 and 
prior models, the modified measure would account for the transit of hazardous materials 
through a port that is not the final destination, providing added precision to the model.30 
4. The Need to Refine Vulnerability 
Another data component that needs to be considered within the vulnerability index 
for the PSGP risk model was foreign vessel calls.31 Even though the PSGP risk model does 
consider foreign-flagged vessels with a foreign port as their last port of call arriving in U.S. 
ports,32 this measure does not account for the variation in risk profiles of these vessels—
as, according to the Coast Guard, not all foreign vessels are considered to be of equal risk.33 
Because the Coast Guard does not view all vessels to be of equal risk, it has developed a 
procedure to identify and target boarding those vessels that pose a high relative security 
risk to a port. This program, the High-Interest Vessel (HIV) Program, collects data that 
classifies arriving vessels according to risk, using multiple factors to establish the vessels’ 
risk profiles.34 
FEMA officials reported that they considered using HIV data in fiscal year 2011, 
but determined that, due to time constraints, it would be more straightforward to use a count 
28 Government Accounting Office, Port Security Grant Program, 22. 
29 The hazardous material (HAZMAT) population data component was part of the consequence index 
in the fiscal year 2010 model. It was moved to the vulnerability index in the fiscal year 2011 model. 
30 Government Accounting Office, Port Security Grant Program, 22. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Government Accounting Office, Port Security Grant Program, 22. 
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of foreign-flagged vessels during the first iteration of the vulnerability index.35 However, 
FEMA officials reported that they will continue to research additional data elements for 
inclusion in future-year risk models.36 Using data from the HIV Program (which the Coast 
Guard already collects) in future iterations of the risk model could position FEMA to better 
capture the vulnerability of port areas to vessels arriving from foreign ports and thereby 
improve the precision of allocations to high-risk port areas.37 
E. ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH RISK VARIABLES: THREAT AND 
CONSEQUENCE 
DHS also has latitude to define how “threat” and “consequence” contribute to 
calculating risk. For most grant allocation programs, FEMA weighs threat as contributing 
20 percent to overall risk, and consequence as contributing 80 percent.38 For some 
programs that serve multi-hazard preparedness, those weights have been adjusted to 10 
percent and 90 percent, respectively, in order to lessen the effect that the threat of terrorism 
has on the prioritizations.39 Because threat has a small effect on FEMA’s risk analysis, 
population is the dominant contributor to the consequence term. Therefore, the risk analysis 
formula used for grant making can be construed as one that, to a first approximation, merely 
uses population as a surrogate for risk.40 FEMA indicated that it does not have the time or 
staff to perform more detailed or specialized consequence modeling, and it also stated to 
GAO that this coarse approximation is relatively acceptable to the entities supported by the 
grants programs.41 
35 Ibid. 23. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 National Research Council, Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach, 35.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 35. 
41 Ibid. 
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1. The Need to Question Threat and Consequences  
It is not clear whether FEMA has ever performed a sensitivity analysis of the 
weightings involved in these risk allocation formulas or evaluated the ramifications of the 
(apparently ad hoc) choices of weightings and parameters in the consequence formulas.42 
For these reasons, in 2010 the National Research Council of the National Academies 
recommended that FEMA should seek an external peer review by technical experts outside 
DHS of its risk-informed formulas for grant allocation to identify any logical flaws with 
the formulas, evaluate the ramifications of the choices of weightings and parameters in the 
consequence formulas, and determine if it could improve the transparency of these grant 
allocation risk models.43 If population density is the primary determinant for grant 
allocations, FEMA’s transparency can be improved by making that explicit. 
2. Controversy of Risk Analysis Model 
Such estimates of the variables that comprise DHS’s risk analysis model have 
sparked controversy within the HSGP. In 2010, when DHS announced a reduction in the 
number of urban areas to be considered for funding under the UASI, the urban areas that 
were going to be cut organized campaigns around the concept of the unknown threat in 
order to maintain grant funds for maintenance and sustainability. Citizens of the urban 
areas slated to be cut were convinced there were significant threats to their areas, and that 
without funds, they would be left vulnerable to terrorist attacks. This was exemplified by 
the state of New Jersey and the commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s protest over New York 
City receiving large sums of homeland security dollars in comparison to their own states. 
Moreover, this triggered equal and opposite reactions from the urban areas that continued 
to be considered for funding. Funded urban areas inferred that the risk analysis performed 
by DHS to allocate homeland security dollars was accurate. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid  
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F. OTHER EXPERT OPINIONS 
There have also been various other expert opinions regarding DHS risk assessment 
methodology and associated grant expenditures. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart’s book, 
Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risk, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland 
Security, suggests that America needs to examine massive homeland security expenditures 
by applying analytical risk management approaches that emphasizes cost-benefit analysis 
and determinations of acceptable and unacceptable risks when developing regulations and 
future funding approaches.44 Such an assessment is deemed critical, since the resulting 
decisions and actions affect the interests of multiple groups.45 
Mueller and Stewart find homeland security expenditures since 9/11 have been 
excessive and not cost-effective.46 In seeking to evaluate the effectiveness of the massive 
increases in homeland security expenditures since September 11, 2001, Congress’ query 
has been, “Are we safe?” However, Mueller and Stewart believe this is the wrong question. 
Of course we are “safer”—the posting of a single security guard at one building’s entrance 
enhances safety, however microscopically. The correct question is, “Are the gains in 
security worth the funds expended?” Or, as this absolutely central question was posed 
shortly after 9/11 by risk analyst Howard Kunreuther, “How much should we be willing to 
pay for a small reduction in probabilities that are already extremely low?”47  
Gregory F. Treverton, in his book Intelligence for the Age of Terror, states, 
“Anyone’s probability of being killed by a terrorist today is essentially zero and would be 
tomorrow, barring any major discontinuity. So, they (American citizens) should do 
nothing.”48 Such an approach deals up front with a key issue in risk assessment—
evaluating the likelihood of a terrorist attack. But such an approach has scarcely ever been 
44 Mueller, and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, abstract. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Howard Kunreuther, “Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World,” Risk Analysis, 
2222, no. 4 (2002): 66–63. See also John Mueller, Some Reflections on What, if Anything, “Are We Safer?” 
Might Mean (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2006). 
48 Gregory Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009). 
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duplicated by politicians and officials in charge of providing public safety.49 Treverton 
believes that the awkward problem of dealing with exceedingly low probabilities has been 
finessed by states and urban areas—and questionable expenditures accordingly justified.50 
He defines this phenomenon as probability neglect and discusses five techniques that are 
utilized to justify spending. 
(1) Focus on Worst-Case Scenarios 
Cass Sunstein assesses the worst-case phenomena, and he believes this scenario 
comes into being when emotions are intensely engaged. He argues that under such 
circumstances, people’s attention is focused on the bad outcome; they are inattentive to the 
fact that it is unlikely to occur and hence mandate a substantial government response.51 
Sunstein explains that expenditures related to a low probability/high consequence can be 
emotionally justified. People want to ignore the conventional risk analysis and believe that 
the nightmare scenario is possible. 
(2) Adding, Rather than Multiplying, the Probabilities 
The second scenario for probability neglect focuses on the mathematics associated 
with calculating the probability of an attack. The author of a CRS from 2007 points out 
that DHS, within its calculation of risk, sums the probability of an attack with the losses 
from that attack. DHS then utilizes the results, within a rating scale, to distribute grant 
funds.52 This procedure violates the principles espoused in accepted risk assessment 
techniques, such as those codified in international risk management standards supported 
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), which is backed by the U.S.53 
 
 
49 Mueller, and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, 5. 
50 Ibid., 5–6. 
51 Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2007), 8–9. 
52 Ted Masses, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, 
Issues, and Options for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 6.  
53 Ibid.  
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(3) Assess Relative, Rather than Absolute Risk 
The third technique, as pointed out by CRS, is to rank relative risk, while neglecting 
to determine the actual magnitude of the risk.54 Relative risk is a statistical term used to 
describe the risk of a certain event happening to one group verses another. Because DHS 
is assessing risk as a means to allocating resources to buy down risk, it is imperative, 
according to DHS, that its risk calculations be relative.55 Risk experts appear to agree that 
all communities have some level of risk from terrorism, and, from a national perspective, 
it is necessary to identify the areas and entities across the country most at risk, and to work 
to reduce that risk. What is less clear, is the best way to evaluate relative homeland security 
risk and establish an acceptable level of risk while attempting to close the most dramatic 
gaps between risk and capabilities.56 
This thesis points out that it may be true that New York is more likely to be struck 
by a terrorist than, say, Columbus, Ohio, and it is also more likely to be struck by a tsunami. 
Before spending a lot of money protecting New York from a tsunami, we need to get some 
sense of the likelihood of that event, not simply of how the risk compares to that borne by 
other cities. The same holds true for terrorism. 
(4) Inflating the Importance of Potential Terrorist Targets 
A fourth technique is to inflate the importance of potential terrorist targets. The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines “critical infrastructure” as “the assets, 
systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the U.S. that their 
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national 
economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof.”57 Yet vast sums 
of money are spent to protect elements of the infrastructure whose incapacitation would 
scarcely be “debilitating” and that would, at most, impose minor inconvenience and quite 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid., 15. 
56 Ibid., 6. 
57 Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2011 (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 2011), 381.  
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limited costs. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were by far the most damaging in history, yet, 
even though several major commercial buildings were demolished, both the economy and 
government continued to function within New York City and the U.S.58 
(5) Inflating Terrorist Capacity 
A final mistake is to massively inflate or to fail to assess the capacities of the 
terrorists, and therefore, by inference, both the likelihood that they will attack and the 
consequences of that attack.59 All five techniques of probability neglect are considered 
within this thesis because, if realistic probabilities that a given target will be struck by 
terrorists were multiplied into the risk calculation, and if the costs of protection from 
unlikely threats were calculated following international risk management standards, it 
would be found that vast amounts of money have been misspent. 
G. LACK OF AN ROI STRATEGY 
Return on investment (ROI) is an important measure of risk assessment 
effectiveness, but DHS’s current risk methodology, threat and hazard identification risk 
assessment (THIRA), does not incorporate ROI and lacks adequate rigor. If a threat or 
hazard can be mitigated and risk can be reduced, that reduction should be measurable. 
Capabilities-building may begin to reflect an ROI if FEMA begins to equate such 
capabilities to having the ability to respond to low-risk events (i.e., consequences 
associated with the incident are not considered significant) and potentially preventing the 
high-risk events from occurring. FEMA’s ROI associated with the building of Boston-area 
capabilities obviously reduced the consequences associated with the marathon bombing. 
This has led to the conclusion that response capabilities, if activated and at the ready (unlike 
the previous NCR examples), can be used to calculate an ROI. 
58 Mueller, and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, 8. 
59Ibid. 
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H. MAKING A HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY WORK, STARTING 
WITH THE END-CONSUMER—THE PUBLIC 
Regardless of the risk methodology DHS utilizes to substantiate an ROI strategy, 
DHS may want to evaluate involving the public in decision making and homeland security 
efforts. In 2008, almost seven years after 9/11, survey data utilizing a nationally 
representative probability sample of several thousand American adults suggests the public 
has sustained desire for, and disappointment in the lack of, government-provided 
opportunities to serve a meaningful role in the country’s response to terrorism.60 The 
survey indicated that only 37 percent of American adults have ever made sacrifices on 
behalf of the “war on terror.”61 Moreover, nearly two-thirds of survey respondents felt that 
government had failed to provide, or clearly explain, ways for average citizens to play a 
role or participate in their country’s defense against terrorism.62 Americans continue to 
seek greater opportunities for political and social engagement following 9/11.63 
I. FUTURE FUNDING STRATEGIES 
Both government and nongovernment players have begun experimenting with 
collaborative dialogue on to how to afford homeland security needs.64 These experiments 
range from public agencies pulling together stakeholders for joint discussions of issues, to 
full-fledged consensus-building efforts, to design proposals for action.65 Some efforts are 
simply about the hope of finding a shared identity as a starting place for change and healing 
community rifts through building trust, transparency, and finding a shared homeland 
60 James N. Breckenridge, The American Perceptions Study: Attitudes and Appraisals of Homeland 
Security (Monterey, CA: The Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 2009). 
61 Fathali M. Moghaddam, and James M. Breckenridge, “The Post-Tragedy ‘Opportunity-Bubble’ and 
the Prospect of Citizen Engagement,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, The 9/11 Essays (September 2011): 1–
4. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Louis Penner et al., “Effects on Volunteering of the September 11, 2001 Attacks: An Archival 
Analysis,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 35, no. 7 (2005): 1333–1360. 
64 Judith E. Innes, and David E. Booher, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative 
Rationality for Public Policy (New York: Routledge, 2010), 4.  
65 Ibid. 
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security reality.66 Crowdfunding67 and bonding homeland security provides direct access 
to citizens and allow citizens to fulfill their desire for a meaningful role in the country’s 
response to terrorism. It may also allow leadership to address the negative perception of 
discounting the average citizen in defense against terrorism and to convince citizens they 
have homeland security responsibilities. This thesis equates to an experiment in a 
collaborative form of public involvement beyond legally mandated forums. 
J. THESIS STATEMENT 
The cumulative increase in U.S. domestic homeland security expenditures over the 
decade since 9/11 exceeds $1 trillion.68 The DHS risk methodology, which provides the 
basis for decisions about allocating these funds to urban areas and states, includes little 
understanding of the ROI. It is highly unlikely that the U.S. government will continue to 
spend trillions of dollars on protection, and therefore, an alternative source of funding is 
needed to sustain homeland security. 
K. CLAIM AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
DHS needs to develop a long-term, capital investment strategy that protects critical 
infrastructure, quantifies an ROI, and provides adequate funding. Can homeland security 
become sustainable by utilizing ROI strategies and a crowdfunding and municipal bonding 
program? 
L. OVERVIEW OF REMAINING CHAPTERS 
Chapter II discusses FEMA’s approach to developing and justifying core 
capabilities utilizing the five-step THIRA process. The THIRA process is reviewed, and 
opinions are presented both regarding FEMA’s strategic management and oversight and 
whether there are appropriate performance measures to gauge success. The response to two 
no-notice events (January, 2011 snow storm and August, 2011 earthquake) in the NCR are 
66 Ibid. 
67 Crowdfunding is by definition, the practice of funding a project or venture by raising many small 
amounts of money from a large number of people, typically via the Internet. 
68 Mueller, and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, executive summary. 
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reviewed to gauge if building response capabilities according to the THIRA process is 
effective and practical. The chapter concludes by claiming that an ROI strategy can be 
created around developing capabilities for planned special events. 
Chapter III investigates how the city of Boston’s response to the marathon bombing 
demonstrated that capabilities, if activated for planned special events, may allow for an 
ROI. The chapter also dissects the testimony of FEMA’s former Deputy Administrator, 
Richard Serino, to Congress regarding FEMA’s investment within the Boston UASI for 
the 10 years prior to the bombing. It is specifically evaluated with regard to the tangible 
and intangible benefits of homeland security grant funds and whether the THIRA process 
was beneficial in presenting potential threats and risks. An alternative ROI calculation 
supports Boston’s investment strategy in capabilities-building as an appropriate approach 
for planned special events. 
Chapter IV presents Lewis’s five-step method of vulnerability and risk assessment. 
His approach is based on network theory and fault tree technology that uses estimates of 
cost and the probability of an attack to compute an investment strategy aimed at reducing 
risk and producing ROI. This method, entitled model based risk assessment (MBRA), is 
reviewed along with the pros and cons of utilizing such a strategy. Step 2 of this process, 
development of fault trees, is utilized to show how the city of Boston may have been able 
to identify the potential threat of an improvised explosive device (IED) triggered during a 
large-scale event and how the city may have minimize its vulnerabilities and associated 
consequences by adding preventative measures. A second example of how MBRA could 
be utilized to evaluate long-term investment is also presented: the New Jersey decision-
making process associated with burying power lines verses building overhead power lines 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. Finally, questions of resiliency and cost are presented, 
as well as a discussion of the impact of local jurisdictions when protecting critical 
infrastructure for long-term security investment. 
Chapter VII investigates crowdfunding and bonding at the individual and local 
jurisdictional levels as alternative methods for funding homeland security investments. The 
processes involved in these methods also engage citizens so they can become homeland 
security decision makers. The answer to the future of homeland security funding lies in the 
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hands of the citizens, and public safety officials must have a means to engage them, to tap 
the ability, desire, and support of the masses. 
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II. FEMA’S NEW MEASURE OF SUCCESS—BUILDING 
CAPABILITIES 
With the introduction of Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) on March 30, 
2011, FEMA began equating gains in security and a reduction in risk to building core 
capabilities69 and the capability targets—the performance thresholds for each of the core 
capabilities. FEMA now allocates grant resources to support developing core capabilities 
for preparedness.70 Table 1 outlines the core capabilities by mission area: prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, or recovery. Such a model replaces “vulnerability” with 
“capability,” in a sense replacing a measure of gaps with a measure of the ability of a 
system or community to withstand an attack or disaster, or to respond to it.71 These 
measures of capabilities can more readily be aggregated to produce regional and national 
measures of security—a macro measure of national “hardness” against homeland security 
hazards.72 
Table 1.   Core Capabilities by Mission Area 
Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery 
Planning 









































69 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011), 1.  
70 Ibid. 
71 National Research Council, Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach, 35. 
72 Ibid. 
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A. JUSTIFYING CAPABILITIES SPENDING THROUGH THIRA 
So how does DHS establish informed and defensible capability targets and commit 
appropriate resources to closing the gap between a target and a current capability or 
sustaining existing capabilities? FEMA’s response can be found in the THIRA guidance. 
FEMA believes that THIRA allows a jurisdiction to understand threats and hazards and 
how impacts may vary according to time of occurrence, season, location, or community 
factors.73 The results of THIRA should be used by jurisdictions to make informed decisions 
about how to allocate resources.74 Additionally, THIRA provides each jurisdiction a 
framework to establish capability targets and monitor progress toward building, sustaining, 
and delivering capabilities, as well as manage the risk it faces.75 
73 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Use of Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment for Preparedness Grants: An Addendum to the THIRA (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency 




                                                 
The THIRA process consists of five basic steps outlined in Figure 1 and explained 
below. 
 
Figure 1.  The Five-Step THIRA Process 
(1) Identify the Threats and Hazards of Concern 
A community should identify a list of the threats and hazards of concern to the 
community based on past experience, forecasting, expert judgment, and available 
resources. FEMA suggests reviewing a list of the types of threats/hazards contained within 
the THIRA guidance to determine potential examples of natural, technological, and/or 
human-caused threats.76 Table 2 shows the threats and hazards that should be considered 
during this identification step. 
Table 2.   List of Threats and Hazards77 
Natural Technological Human-Caused 
Avalanche Airplane crash Biological attack 
Animal disease outbreak Dam failure Chemical attack 
Drought Levee failure Cyber incident 
Earthquake Mine accident Explosive attack 
Epidemic 
Hazardous materials 
release Radiological attack 
Flood Power failure Sabotage 
Hurricane Radiological release 
76 Department of Homeland Security, Threat and Hazard Identification, 3.  
77 Ibid., 6. 
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Natural Technological Human-Caused 
Landslide Train derailment 
School and workplace 
violence 







(2) Give Threats and Hazards Context 
Using the list of threats and hazards, develop context that shows how those threats 
and hazards may affect a community.78 This step is concerned with the “when” and 
“where” for each of the threats and hazards identified in Step 1. 
(3) Examine the Core Capabilities Using the Threats and Hazards 
Using the threat and hazard context, identify impacts to the community through the 
lens of the core capabilities described in the National Preparedness Goal (GOAL).79 This 
step requires the community to identify the desired outcomes against the predefined core 
capabilities. 
(4) Set Capability Targets 
Looking across the estimated impacts to the community, in the context of each core 




78 Ibid., 2. 
79 Ibid., 3 
80 Ibid. 
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(5) Apply the Results 
Build the resources to deliver the targeted level of capability with either community 
assets or through mutual aid, identify mitigation opportunities, and drive preparedness 
activities.81 
The THIRA guidance illustrates this five-step process: 
A jurisdiction identifies tornadoes as a hazard and assesses its 
vulnerabilities if a tornado strikes at different times, seasons, and locations. 
Using the core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal 
(GOAL), the jurisdiction assesses the impacts and identifies the highest 
potential capability target level for Fatality Management Services. 
Preparing for response, the jurisdiction develops typed resources using the 
National Incident Management System to accomplish the required Fatality 
Management Services target. These resources are either built or sustained 
through collaboration with non-traditional partners, mutual aid planning, or 
direct investment by the jurisdiction. The jurisdiction may also undertake 
mitigation planning and projects such as safe rooms and warning systems 
that have been proven to lessen fatalities. Taking these actions reduces 
vulnerability, lowering the Fatality Management Services capability target 
in future THIRAs. 
To be effective, FEMA believes the THIRA process requires the participation of 
the whole community in sharing information, accounting for population-specific factors, 
and understanding the initial and cascading effects of a threat or hazard. Analysis of the 
THIRA results should guide future preparedness efforts across all mission areas, allowing 
a jurisdiction to develop a strategy to allocate resources effectively, achieve capability 
targets, and reduce risk.82 Such a strategy should consider finding, connecting to, and 
strengthening community resources by leveraging the expertise and capabilities of 
individuals, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and 
all levels of government;83 ultimately, a jurisdiction may find that it must fill gaps in order 
to build and sustain capabilities. Finally, the analysis can also be used to educate 
81 Ibid., 2.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid.  
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individuals, families, businesses, organizations, and executive leaders on the risks facing 
their community and on their roles in preparedness. 
FEMA trusts that the THIRA process ensures a shared understanding of capabilities 
and requirements across the nation by reviewing local and state THIRAs through a review 
process that includes all regional partners in a collaborative effort with the states.84 This 
review ensures that each submitted THIRA is developed in alignment with the 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 and answers the following questions: 
1. Did the jurisdiction provide description statements of the threats and 
hazards of concern? 
2. Did the jurisdiction provide outcome statements for all 31 Core Capabilities 
from the GOAL? 
3. Did the jurisdiction provide estimated impacts for all threats and hazards of 
concern in relation to the 31 Core Capabilities? 
4. Did the jurisdiction provide capability targets for all 31 Core Capabilities? 
5. Did the jurisdiction provide an affirmation that their submittal is in 
compliance with CPG 201?85 
The FEMA regions will engage with their partners across the whole community 
(including other federal agencies) to develop Regional THIRAs.86 This process will 
leverage information contained in the strategic national risk assessment (SNRA) as well as 
inform its future revision to ensure it accurately reflects regional variation in threats and 
hazards.87 
B. THIRA’S ROI QUESTIONED 
On March 20, 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 
Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, 
questioned FEMA’s new approach during a hearing entitled Ensuring the Transparency, 
Efficiency, and Effectiveness of Homeland Security Grants. Testimony was presented by 
84 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Use of Threat and Hazard Identification, 2. 
85 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
Information Sheet (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013). 
86 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Use of Threat and Hazard Identification, 2. 
87 Ibid. 
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the Assistant Inspector General for Audits of DHS’ Office of Inspector General (OIG), 
Ann L. Richards, who discussed FEMA’s need to make improvements in strategic 
management, performance measurement, and oversight, to ensure the transparency, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of the grant process.88 Specifically, the Inspector General 
pointed out that strategic planning, performance measurement, and oversight—including 
tracking states’ milestones and accomplishments for HSGP-funded programs—are 
important management controls, ensuring federal funds are utilized for their intended 
purpose and preparedness capabilities are enhanced.89 
Building capabilities enhances public safety officials’ understanding of the 
potential threats they face and the capabilities they will need to prevent, protect, mitigate, 
respond, and recover from a potential disaster. However, except for in instances of planned 
events, difficulties arise when operating and implementing prevention and protection 
capabilities. This indicates that prevention and protection capabilities only work well 
during such planned events in which operating centers are activated. 
The Honorable Michael A. Nutter, Mayor of Philadelphia and Vice President of the 
U.S. Conference of Mayors, also submitted testimony that questioned if local government 
officials, emergency managers, and first responders have a role in the THIRA process so 
that local (i.e., major cities within large states) concerns are taken into consideration when 
assessing capability gaps. Mayor Nutter explained his firsthand experience of the risks 
associated with the city of Philadelphia, which were dismissed from homeland security 
grant fund consideration at the state level. He also questioned if FEMA can ensure federal 
funding is utilized to improve preparedness in high-risk areas, as recommended by the 9/
11 Commission.90 Mayor Nutter’s statements point to the issue that FEMA guidance 
88 Hearing before Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Response, and Communications, U.S. House of Representatives, Ensuring the Transparency, Efficiency, 
and Effectiveness of Homeland Security Grants, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Ann L. Richards, Office 
of Inspector General).  
89 Ibid. 
90 Hearing before Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Response, and Communications, U.S. House of Representatives, Ensuring the Transparency, Efficiency, 
and Effectiveness of Homeland Security Grants, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Michael Nutter, Mayor 
of the City of Philadelphia) 
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directs authority for the development of the THIRA and the distribution of homeland 
security grant dollars to the individual states. The state may not, and does not have to, agree 
with the THIRA analysis performed by the metropolitan areas within the state. For 
example, Philadelphia may have determined that acts of terrorism are the leading threat for 
the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The commonwealth may not agree, and instead 
believe the largest threat is flooding due to large storms. 
C. THE PRACTICALITY OF CAPABILITIES-BUILDING 
Conceptually, it makes sense to think of building up capabilities in order to add to 
local jurisdictions’ and states’ collective homeland security. But is it practical? This 
question was the basis of a 2012 GAO evaluation of the NCR’s management of grant 
resources, under the supervision of FEMA, to build capabilities.91 The NCR is an urban 
area that includes the District of Columbia and local jurisdictions in the state of Maryland 
and the commonwealth of Virginia.92 A network of committees—composed of senior 
federal, state, and local officials and subject matter experts—work together to allocate 
homeland security grant funds to build the core capabilities needed to achieve the GOAL.93 
Since 2003, DHS has allocated over $560 million through the UASI grant program to the 
NCR.94 To help facilitate operational communications and information sharing across 
local, state, and federal government entities within the NCR during an emergency, over 
$24 million of UASI funds were utilized to purchase communication tools and programs, 
including  
(1) Web Emergency Operations Center  
91 Government Accounting Office, Performance Measures and Comprehensive Funding Data Could 
Enhance Management of the National Capital Region Preparedness Resources (GAO-13-116R), 
(Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2013), 1.  
92 10 U.S.C. 2674(f)(2).  
93 UASI grant recipients must create a working group with representation from the region that will be 
responsible for coordinating development and implementation of program elements. Before funding can be 
distributed, DHS also requires each UASI recipient to develop and submit a strategic plan that outlines the 
region’s common goals, objectives, and steps for implementation. The strategy is intended to provide each 
recipient with direction for enhancing regional capability and capacity to prevent and reduce vulnerability.  
94 Government Accounting Office, Performance Measures and Comprehensive Funding Data, 1. 
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A web emergency operations center is a web-enabled, user-friendly, and locally-
configurable incident and event management system. With access to the Internet, 
authorized emergency managers and first responders, regardless of location, can enter and 
view incident information on WebEOC status boards. WebEOC enables users to manage 
multiple incidents and daily events, assign and track missions and tasks, provide situation 
reports, manage resources, and prepare reports.95  
(2) Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System 
Regional Incident Communication and Coordination System (RICCS) consists of 
two securely-hosted servers and software with capabilities for conference calling, short text 
messages to cell phones or pagers, and longer messages to email accounts. RICCS is 
utilized by public safety officials and the NCR leadership to rapidly communicate 
emergency information to area officials, and to convene conference calls or other meetings 
for decision-making.96 
(3) The Emergency Management Network 
The Emergency Management Network (EMNet) is a secure, satellite-based 
messaging system allowing emergency operations centers (EOCs) to coordinate response, 
recovery, and requests for assistance if other commercially-based systems fail.97  
(4) Washington Area Warning System  
The Washington Area Warning System (WAWAS) is a FEMA-owned system 
utilized by NCR partners, which is the primary audio alert and information-sharing system 
among EOCs during an incident. The NCR has built a system of communication and 
collaboration tools between all jurisdictions’ EOCs that includes videoconferencing and 
95 WebEOC [product sheet], accessed December 12, 2014, 
http://www.esi911.com/esi/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=30  
96 The RICCS system sends notices to email, pagers, and mobile phones and continues to operate if 
mobile voice bandwidth becomes jammed. It currently serves about 1,500 users in more than 50 groups, 
which include top local, state, and federal officials in each homeland security and emergency management 
discipline. RICCS is owned by the Metropolitan Washington MWCOG and is independent of the citizen 
alerting systems operated by local governments with UASI funds. 
97 Currently the systems receive all messages sent out by the National Weather Service and other 
authorized senders.  
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satellite phone communications dispatch service. The videoconferening system, installed 
in 2007, allows EOCs and other government agencies to communicate with each other via 
video bridge. The satellite phones are used for regional emergency management 
communications when primary and secondary communications fail during an event. 
(5) NCRnet 
The National Captial Region Net (NCRnet) is a UASI-funded, private, fiber optic 
communications network that interconects the NCR jurisdictions and provides the primary 
underlying communications interconnectivity for video conferencing capabilities. Despite 
multiple communications tools and systems put in place since 9/11, none were activated 
during a fast-moving snowstorm on January 26, 2011 or the earthquake on August 23, 
2011.98 This resulted in a lack of real-time, situational awareness, and minimal regional 
communication and coordination, causing emergency management officials and first 
responders to react to each of the incidents, rather than act proactively before the impact 
occurred. Regional situational awareness, one of the 31 core capabilities, was not present 
for either event. 
During the January 26, 2011, snowstorm conditions deteriorated rapidly in the NCR 
as heavy precipitation overspread the region at the start of the late afternoon rush hour. 
Colder air moved into the area during this time, which caused the precipitation to change 
quickly to sleet and then to heavy snow. Heavy snow continued through the evening hours 
with snowfall rates around two to three inches per hour during the height of the event.99 
Many commuters experienced eight to 12 hour commutes due to snow and ice covered 
roads; abandoned and disabled cars, trucks, and buses; and outages of traffic signals lacking 
backup power.100 A November 2011 report by regional officials found that some of the 
problems cited during the snowstorm were caused by early dismissal of many of the 
98 Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, Report of the Steering Committee on Incident 
Management and Response: A Proposal for a Regional Incident Coordination Program and over a Dozen 
Other Improvements to Enhance Incident Management and Response in the National Capital Region 
(Washington, DC: Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, 2011). 
99 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Snowfall Totals,” National Weather Service 
Forecast, January 26, 2011, http://www.erh.noaa.gov/lwx/events/snow_20110126/ 
100 Government Accounting Office, Performance Measures and Comprehensive Funding, 5. 
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region’s employees, which resulted in a compressed rush hour just as weather and traffic 
conditions were deteriorating.101 Despite the worsening traffic, no regional officials 
initiated a conference call to exchange information and coordinate a phased release of 
workers or to consider a region-wide message to the public, even though they had 
purchased the capabilities to do so utilizing homeland security grant funds.102 
Later in the year on August 23, 2011, the largest earthquake to hit the mid-Atlantic 
states of the U.S. in more than a century jolted the NCR, prompting widespread building 
evacuations, snarling traffic, and sending emergency crews scrambling after reports of 
superficial damage and minor injuries. The quake rumbled across the D.C. region at 1:51 
p.m., bewildering tourists, residents, and workers who spilled onto city streets while 
offices, schools, and attractions were inspected for structural damage. The U.S. Geological 
Survey estimated the magnitude of the earthquake at 5.8.103 Once again, emergency 
decision makers turned inward and focused on the immediate concerns of their individual 
jurisdiction or state; there was minimal regional communication about evacuating the 
downtown core of Washington, D.C., This was exemplified in the abrupt release of federal 
government workers, who make up approximately 40 percent of the workforce in 
Washington, D.C., Federal workers flooded the transportation networks in a simultaneous 
race to get home.  
Examining the history of numerous previous events, it is a known fact that the 
transportation networks in the NCR cannot support the mass evacuation of downtown 
Washington, D.C., without a phased release of the federal government workforce. Streets 
in the downtown core immediately become congested and the congestion spreads in 
concentric rings from downtown to the outer suburbs. It was again obvious that the release 
of the federal workforce was neither communicated nor coordinated. Situational 
awareness, regional coordination, and public alerts and warnings were cited by regional 
101 Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, Report of the Steering Committee. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Dave Boyer, Tom Howell, and Shaun Waterman, “5.8 Magnitude Quake Jolts Eastern US,” 
Washington Times, August 23, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/23/earthquake-
jolts-dc-area/?page=all  
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officials as capabilities needing enhancement in the region’s assessment of the response to 
the January 26, 2011, snowstorm and the August 23, 2011, earthquake.104 The NCR had 
spent $24 million dollars for six separate communication tools to have regional situational 
awareness during an emergency, but none of the tools were utilized during fairly minor 
natural emergencies. 
D. ROI ANALYSIS—THREAT, VULNERABILITY, AND CONSEQUENCE 
If one applies the five THIRA steps to winter storms and other natural disasters, it 
is apparent that the NCR adhered to the process by purchasing communications capabilities 
to assist in preventing gridlock and responding to such incidents. However, the capabilities 
were not activated during either of the above no-notice events, with negative consequences. 
Based on the risk calculations, the NCR purchased communications equipment to 
coordinate the federal government and notify the public, but the capabilities were not 
utilized. There was no reduction in risk from the communications equipment, so the ROI 
for purchasing the capabilities is zero in both cases; the expenditures are not cost-effective. 
It is challenging to quantify the ROI associated with building capabilities. Even if the 
communications tools were activated the day of each event, it is difficult to see a way or a 
means of quantifying how many lives were saved, how many injuries prevented, or how 
much less road congestion existed due to a coordinated release. It also cannot be 
determined how many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to increased capabilities. 
For example, what if three individuals were stopped in Logan airport today because of 
small pocket knives in their carry-on luggage? The individuals would be asked to discard 
the knives prior to entering the terminal and would be able to continue on with their trip. 
Has the increase in screening capabilities at airports thwarted terrorism attempts? The 
answer is that we do not know, nor will we ever know. These unknowables are the type of 
quantifiable data government officials and the public want to justify homeland security 
grant expenditures. 
Rather than search for the illusive answers surrounding natural disasters or thwarted 
terrorist activities, FEMA should focus on calculating the ROI of grant expenditures for 
104 Government Accounting Office, Performance Measures and Comprehensive Funding, 4. 
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special events, such as the Boston Marathon. During such special events, the capabilities 
that have been purchased are activated to prevent incidents from occurring or prevent 
severe consequences if an incident does occur. The event itself allows for additional 
parameters to be established such as a specified amount of time and space, and approximate 
number of individuals associated with the event. The parameters allow for pre- and post-
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III. HOW TO CALCULATE DHS’ ROI IN RESPONSE TO THE 
BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS 
DHS said during the response to the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon incident, the 
City of Boston’s preparedness systems worked as they should, unlike the NCR’s 
preparedness systems in the previous examples. DHS attests that, because of the investment 
in local and state resources, the city of Boston was not overwhelmed the day of the event 
but instead was able to effectively respond.105 The city’s response demonstrates an ROI 
and shows significant progress over the previous 10 years.106 But some believe that the 
success of the response was due to a number of fortunate (and unrepeatable) circumstances, 
and there are still significant concerns that FEMA’s grant programs do too little to ensure 
that grant funding is spent addressing the highest threats and risks.107 
This chapter investigates how the city of Boston’s response demonstrates that 
capabilities, if activated for planned special events, allow for an alternative ROI calculation 
by evaluating the number of lives saved against the total UASI funds spent by the city. 
Such a calculation indicates that capabilities-building can work as an investment strategy. 
A. DHS’S ROI 
In his testimony before the Homeland Security Government Affairs Committee on 
July 10, 2013, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator Serino stated,  
Quite simply, our preparedness system worked that day like it should: we 
invested in local and state resources, those resources were not overwhelmed 
the day of the event, and local and state responders were able to effectively 
respond. This shows the efficacy of our programs and demonstrates our 
return on investment.  
This statement shows that FEMA has begun to equate the successful response to 
the increased capabilities in the Boston UASI. But the consequences associated with the 
105 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings (testimony of Richard Serino), 5.  
106 Ibid. 
107 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings: Preparing For and Responding to the 
Attack, Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong., 
(2013) (remarks by Tom Coburn).  
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Boston Marathon bombings were not considered significant from a terrorist-event 
prospective. Four lives were lost during the bombing incident, including one law 
enforcement official associated with the apprehension of the terrorists. Simply, the 
consequences associated with this event were not considered significant. It is questionable 
whether FEMA can measure if the increased capabilities purchased with homeland security 
grant funds actually saved lives that day. 
To support the claim that FEMA reaped an ROI, four critical points are made (1) 
FEMA’s guidance served as the basis for the collective response;108 (2) FEMA’s grant 
funds provided commodities and training that were essential in response to the 
explosion;109 (3) Boston’s 2012 THIRA accurately identified complex attacks (such as a 
mass casualty or active shooter) as one of the top threats and hazards, allowing grant dollars 
to be spent appropriately;110 and (4) with FEMA’s assistance, state and local public safety 
officials demonstrated proper incident response. 
1. FEMA’s ROI: A Collective Response  
FEMA defines “whole community” as an approach to emergency management that 
reinforces the notion that we must leverage the resources of our collective team at every 
level of government to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from, 
all hazards, and that collectively we must meet the needs of the entire community in each 
of these areas.111 This larger collective emergency management team includes state, local, 
tribal, and territorial partners as well as non-governmental organizations like faith-based 
and non-profit groups, the private sector, individuals, families, and communities, who 
continue to be the nation’s most important assets as first responders during a disaster.112 
But FEMA continues to search for innovative ways to involve the private sector, 
individuals, families, and communities within homeland security strategies. 
108 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings (testimony of Richard Serino), 5. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., 9. 
111 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal, A-2. 
112 Ibid. 
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FEMA provides proof that the collective guidance assisted in developing the whole 
community response. Deputy Administrator Serino testified that on April 15, 2013, 
Americans witnessed the strength of the whole community—people coming together to 
help each other and making America’s collective response that much more effective and 
efficient.113 FEMA supports such a statement by accepting that the approach to national 
preparedness helped to empower and strengthen the whole community, by giving its 
members the right tools and information they needed to be prepared114 through its 
preparedness programs: training and exercises, technical assistance, and community 
preparedness. 
FEMA considers the National Preparedness System (NPS) as the instrument that 
the nation employs to build, sustain, and deliver the core capabilities that work toward the 
GOAL. FEMA requires grantees, including both the commonwealth of Massachusetts and 
the city of Boston, to implement the NPS and establish a whole-community approach to 
homeland security and emergency management.115 FEMA concluded that because of the 
NPS implementation, the whole Boston community was better planned, organized, 
equipped, trained, and exercised, resulting in improved preparedness and resilience.  
FEMA’s guidance also served as the basis for the collective response. First 
responders in Boston used the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 
National Response Framework (NRF) as the basis for developing and conducting exercises 
before the event.116 Agencies and organizations involved adopted the Incident Command 
System (ICS), conducted planning and operations using unified command, and integrated 
aspects of the region’s disaster plans into the event’s operations plan.117 
113 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings (testimony of Richard Serino), 3. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid., 4.  
117 Ibid. 
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2. FEMA’s ROI: Sources of HSGPs 
The second of four areas where FEMA experienced an ROI was within its HSGP. 
Many of the capabilities demonstrated in Boston and in the immediate aftermath of the 
bombings were built or enhanced, and have been sustained, through the preparedness suite 
of HSGPs, including the UASI Grant Program and the SHSP.118 Since 2002, the 
commonwealth of Massachusetts has received more than $943 million in FEMA 
preparedness grant funds.119 Since 2003, Boston itself has received more than $369 million 
through eight grant programs, including $179 million through UASI grants.120 Both 
Massachusetts and Boston invested state, local, and federal grant funds in systems that 
were considered critical during the response.121 FEMA believes that the grant funds 
provided resources and training that were essential in response to the explosions. 
a. Resources  
• Boston implemented the Emergency Patient Tracking System, a secure, 
web-based application that facilitates incident management, family 
reunification, and overall accountability for patients during emergency 
incidents. The system ensured patients were triaged and transported in an 
orderly manner to the appropriate hospital based on their needs.122 
• The Boston Public Health Commission (BPHC) invested $200,000 in Mass 
Casualty Incident (MCI) medical supplies and equipment to stock the 
special operations vehicles at the marathon, which proved crucial in 
responding to victims of the bombings.123 
• BPHC also used more than $920,000 in grant funds for first responder 
safety, including purchasing equipment and supplies such as personal 
protective equipment and radiation dosimeters for first responders.124 Both 
the protective equipment and the radiation dosimeters were used in the 
immediate aftermath of the bombings. 




122 Ibid.  
123 Ibid., 5.  
124 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings (testimony of Richard Serino), 5. 
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• The grant funds also supported planning and coordination, authorizing staff 
salaries for medical surge planning projects (such as patient tracking), and 
coordinating health and medical services. These capabilities were 
particularly essential in ensuring a coordinated and successful response and 
recovery operation following the blasts.125 
• HSGP grants provided more than $3 million for screening, search, and 
detection equipment, such as a forward-looking, infrared imaging unit used 
by the Massachusetts State Police to search for, locate, and apprehend the 
surviving bombing suspect, and the camera systems that were used during 
the post-incident investigation.126 
• More than $7 million in UASI grants were leveraged for on-site security 
and protection, including much of the equipment used during the event, such 
as bomb robots, x-ray equipment, and ballistic helmets and vests.127 
• Operational communications were bolstered, with nearly $15 million in 
funding through UASI grants going toward such enhancements as the 
addition of frequencies to support the regional mutual aid radio systems, 
which include law enforcement, fire services, and EMS.128 
b. Training, Exercises, and Technical Assistance 
First responders of the commonwealth and Boston UASI also trained and exercised 
through support from FEMA, making them more equipped to serve their communities 
during real-world incidents. Training examples include: 
• Since 2000, more than 5,500 Boston area responders received training 
through FEMA partners, including the National Domestic Preparedness 
Consortium (NDPC) and Continuing Training Grantees. During that same 
period, FEMA’s Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) provided 
chemical/biological and mass casualty training to more than 500 Boston 
responders and providers.129 
• FEMA supported 12 exercises directly involving the City of Boston, 
including topics as diverse as chemical and biological attacks, hurricane 
preparedness, hazardous materials events, cyber threats, and IEDs.130 In 
2011, DHS, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
and the National Counterterrorism Center, hosted a Joint Counterterrorism 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid., 6. 
127 Ibid.  
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings (testimony of Richard Serino), 6. 
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Awareness Workshop that focused on integrating response operations to a 
complex attack in the Boston metropolitan area. More than 200 participants 
from the local, state, and federal communities participated in the 
workshop.131 
• In 2012, as part of FEMA’s Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant 
Program, the Metro Boston Homeland Security Region (MBHSR) 
exercised the Regional Catastrophic Coordination Plan (RCCP) designed to 
augment existing operations plans by facilitating communication, 
situational awareness, and functional area coordination across the region in 
a catastrophic event.132 
• More than $275,000 was used to fund MCI training, education, and 
exercises for first responders. In 2003, Boston Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS) utilized funding to pilot a training and exercise program, which later 
became the DelValle Institute for Emergency Preparedness, and that has 
since trained tens of thousands of first responders.133 
• In March 2013, grant funds were used to coordinate a psychological first-
aid course for first responders providing pre-hospital medical care.134 
• Boston also used UASI funds to train SWAT teams to better integrate bomb 
technicians into tactical operations, a crucial capability that was 
demonstrated in the aftermath of the marathon bombings.135 
• DHS technical assistance and funding enabled the City of Boston to codify 
its emergency response plans and protocols through planning support 
initiatives including assistance with IED awareness, fusion centers, 
equipment, anti-terrorism training, and interoperable communications. 
Further, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Office 
of Emergency Communications (OEC) worked closely with jurisdictions in 
the MBHSR to improve coordination, training, and tactical planning for 
emergency communications. 
FEMA asserts that the ROI for training, exercising, and planning is the 
development of new skills, the promotion of continuous improvement, and the 
development of relationships before they must be relied upon in a crisis,136 which allows 
for a reduction in consequences associated with an event and a reduction in overall risk. 
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., 5.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., 7. 
136 Ibid., 6. 
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c. FEMA’s ROI: Boston’s 2012 THIRA Identified the Potential Threat 
To provide a common, consistent approach for identifying and assessing risks and 
associated impacts, the City of Boston developed its 2012 THIRA. The THIRA expanded 
on existing state, territorial, tribal, and local hazard identification and risk assessments. The 
results guided preparedness efforts across all mission areas and educated individuals, 
families, businesses, organizations, and executive leaders on the risks facing the city and 
on their roles in preparedness. FEMA testified that Boston’s 2012 THIRA identified 
complex attacks, such as the Boston Marathon bombing, as one of the top threats/
hazards.137 This assessment assisted the commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Boston 
urban area in planning and preparing for such a scenario and prioritizing the development 
of capabilities to address known and evolving threats. 
d. FEMA’s ROI: Appropriate Incident Response  
Finally, the Boston Marathon was evaluated by the interagency Special Events 
Working Group (SEWG), managed by the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and 
Planning, and was determined to be a high-risk event, which resulted in enhanced attention 
across federal agencies and assured a greater level of situational awareness and 
coordination of dedicated federal resources.138 Through its interagency relationships and 
established special event processes, DHS was positioned to respond very quickly to the 
needs of state and local partners.139 This preparation was instrumental to the rapid federal 
response to the Boston Marathon bombing in several ways: 
• FEMA participated in Boston Marathon security coordination meetings 
with other federal, state, and local partners including: DHS NPPD Federal 
Protective Service (FPS), the Massachusetts Homeland Security Advisor, 
the Commonwealth Fusion Center/Massachusetts State Police Counter-
Intelligence Unit; the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), and the 
FBI/Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).140 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid.. 7. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings (testimony of Richard Serino), 7. 
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• While intelligence reporting indicated no credible threat to the event, its 
designation as a Special Events Assessment Rating (SEAR) by the SEWG 
meant there were federal, state, and local security and logistical support 
resources on hand.141 The FBI was designated the event’s lead federal law 
enforcement agency and the Massachusetts State Police was the designated 
lead local law enforcement and public safety organization.142 The 
Massachusetts EOC was the designated operations center for the event. 
• The DHS Massachusetts Protective Security Advisor (PSA) participated in 
Boston Marathon security coordination meetings and worked directly with 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure to identify facilities in 
proximity to the event. Engagement included documenting protective 
measures, reviewing past assessments, providing local and state partners 
with map books of all critical infrastructure and chemical facilities in close 
proximity to the marathon route, and monitoring infrastructure on a real-
time basis.143 
• FEMA activated Region I’s Regional Response Coordination Center 
(RRCC) and the Region’s Incident Management Assistance Team 
(IMAT).144 
• FEMA monitored the situation from headquarters in Washington, D.C., 
coordinating with other agencies at the National Watch Center (NWC), 
which coordinates closely with the DHS National Operations Center for 
national-level information sharing, situational awareness, and common 
operating picture.145 The NWC was activated to Enhanced Watch to include 
the NWC Threat Monitoring Team, and additional personnel were advised 
of the potential for a deployment. 
FEMA believes that an ROI was demonstrated by the effective response to the 
Boston Marathon bombing. The bombing scenario was identified as a possibility utilizing 
THIRA, capabilities were purchased accordingly, and FEMA guidance ensured a 
coordinated and managed response. 
 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid., 8.  
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 7.  
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B. CAPABILITIES-BUILDING—AN ROI CALCULATION 
Capabilities-building may begin to reflect an ROI if FEMA equates such 
capabilities to responding to low-risk events (i.e., consequences associated with the 
incident are not considered significant) and potentially preventing the high-risk events from 
occurring. FEMA’s ROI associated with building capabilities within the Boston area 
obviously reduced the consequences associated with the marathon bombing. For example, 
assume, as the current administration has for spending calculation purposes, that a human 
life is worth $6 million.146 A FEMA lesson-learned memo indicates that more than 140 
lives were saved147 due to the response capabilities in place the day of the bombing. This 
would equate to an ROI of over 469 percent if one utilizes the $179 million in UASI funds 
given to Boston as a direct investment in building capabilities; FEMA can confidently say 
that the homeland security investment in the city of Boston has a tangible ROI. 
As previously mentioned, this has led to the conclusion that response capabilities, 
if activated and at the ready, (unlike the previous NCR examples) can be used to calculate 
an ROI. Response capabilities can also assist in calculating ROIs for natural disasters in 
which public safety officials have time to activate the purchased capabilities. For example, 
the numerous communication and warning tools in tornado- prone areas of America have 
given individuals adequate time to find shelter prior to the arrival of the tornado, saving 
lives. Even though the January 26, 2011 snowstorm in the NCR was predicted, the rate of 
snowfall was not, and public safety officials did not activate capabilities to assist in 
preventing the transportation consequences. 
Deputy Administrator Serino summed up FEMA’s position regarding the Boston 
Marathon bombing: 
Although we will never forget those whose lives were lost, as a community 
we can take some solace that our preparedness efforts helped saved lives. 
At FEMA, we often stress that there is no one agency or entity responsible 
146 Binyamin Appelbaum, “As the U.S. Agencies Put More Value on Life, Business Fret,” New York 
Times, February 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/17regulation.html  
147 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Boston Marathon Bombing, Hospital Readiness and 




                                                 
for emergency response. It takes a whole community of emergency 
responders to prepare for disasters and save lives. I have never been so 
proud to be a part of the Boston community as I was on April 15. We owe 
it to those whom we lost and to those who were injured that day to keep 
improving—and we will work with all of our partners across this great 
country to honor that moving forward.148 
The city of Boston also supports that FEMA’s investment produced a significant 
ROI and was exemplified in the response to the Boston Marathon bombings. Kurt N. 
Schwartz, Undersecretary for Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisor, and 
Director of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency testified at the same 
hearing as Serino. Undersecretary Schwartz stated that the response to the events 
surrounding the Boston Marathon demonstrated the value of the money, time, and 
resources invested in local, state, and federal homeland security since 2001. Within seconds 
of the bomb blasts at the finish line, an array of personnel, resources, and capabilities, many 
funded with federal homeland security grant dollars, were ready to triage and care for the 
wounded, communicate with the public, provide situational awareness for decision makers, 
ensure the safety and security of the public and critical infrastructure, set up a joint 
command center, and ultimately identify and apprehend the suspected terrorists. Schwarz 
insists there is a clear correlation between the effectiveness of response operations in and 
around Boston in the aftermath of the bombings, and the local, regional, and state 
investments in building and sustaining capabilities.149 
1. Measuring an ROI Alongside Boston’s Luck-Factor  
Doctor Arthur L. Kellermann, the Paul O’Neill-Alcoa Chair of Policy Analysis at 
the Rand Corporation, in his testimony entitled “What Should We Learn From Boston?,” 
expressed concern about how DHS measures ROI and that the federal government’s grant 
monitoring effort has focused more on structure (e.g., facilities, equipment, and supplies) 
and process (e.g., the number and type of people hired, trainings held) than on desired 
148 Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings (testimony of Richard Serino). 
149 Attacks on the Homeland, Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, 113th Cong., 
(2013) (Kurt N. Schwarz, Undersecretary, Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts), www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg82590/html/CHRG-113hhrg82590.htm 
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outcomes—the capabilities local and state governments must have to successfully manage 
a disaster or terrorist attack.150 He questioned whether or not FEMA’s grant programs are 
employing adequate measures to assess grantee activities and performance.151 Regardless 
of whether FEMA’s current approach to grants is altered or retained, FEMA faces the 
difficult task of identifying a manageable number of straightforward standards, focusing 
less on the process of grant management and more on achieving desired capabilities and 
outcomes.  
To prove his point, Kellermann focused on the medical response to the Boston 
Marathon bombing. He specifically points out the reason so many victims of the Boston 
Marathon bombing survived that day: because Boston first responders were both prepared 
and lucky. To explain how “luck” played a role, Kellerman speaks to six factors that 
worked in the rescuers’ favor the day of the bombing: 
1. The bombers targeted a major event where large numbers of police, 
security, and EMS personnel were pre-deployed. This dramatically 
shortened response times.152 Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma, in his 
opening remarks during the hearing, supported this statement by pointing 
out,  
The Boston bombing first responders were heroic in minimizing the loss of 
life, but a number of fortunate (and unrepeatable) circumstances contributed 
to the successful response. The state, city, and first responder community 
engaged in extensive planning to support the marathon every year. This 
included preparing for mass casualties among the runners; maintaining a 
heavy police, EMS, first responder, and volunteer presence; and running a 
table-top exercise each year prior to the event to practice responding to 
different types of scenarios.153 
150 David Dausey, Nicole Lurie, and Alex Diamond, “Public Health Response to Urgent Case 
Reports,” Data Watch, August 30, 2005, 10.1377/hlthaff.w5.412  
151 Tom Coburn, Safety at Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Homeland Security Spending in U.S. 
Cities, 2012, http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b86fdaeb-86ff-4d19-
a112-415ec85aa9b6  
152 What Should We Learn From Boston? Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong., 1 (2013) (testimony of Arthur L. Kellermann).  
153 Ibid. 
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2. The day of the Boston Marathon is a state holiday for the commonwealth, 
so the city’s streets were not choked with traffic.154 
3. Hospitals were operating at slightly less than maximal capacity. The attack 
happened shortly before the 3 p.m. shift change, which means that, 
because day-shift staff remained on duty, double the normal complement 
of health care providers was on-site at every facility.155 
4. The bombs exploded in the heart of a city that is home to seven trauma 
centers and several world-class hospitals. Senator Coburn referred to 
Boston’s medical infrastructure as some of the best in the world. Because 
Boston EMS took care to evenly distribute the casualties, each trauma 
center received a manageable number of victims. 
5. The two relatively low-yield bombs exploded out-of-doors. Typically, 
closed-space bombings are more severe because surrounding walls 
concentrate blast waves.156 Lack of any structural collapse facilitated the 
rapid extrication of and medical attention to victims.157 
6. U.S. military healthcare providers in Iraq and Afghanistan had gained 
extensive experience in responding to IED injuries, with explosive devices 
accounting for three-quarters of injuries to American personnel. Their 
lessons learned have spread through the U.S. trauma care community,158 
and almost every hospital has a surgeon, nurse, or medic with battlefield 
experience, as well as trauma personnel who have deployed internationally 
for disaster response efforts.159 
Kellermann also points to three factors that explain why Boston first responders are 
considered, in his words, “good” and why possessing that quality was a significant factor 
in the medical response: bystander response, preparation of EMS, fire, and police, and the 
hospitals were prepared to do a good job.  
Rather than flee the scene, runners tore off their shirts and used them as tourniquets, 
or applied direct pressure to slow bleeding. Bystanders pulled barriers aside to create access 
154 City of Boston, “Traffic and Parking Advisory, Marathon Weekend,” April 10, 2013, 
http://www.cityofboston.gov/news/Default.aspx?id=6076  
155 What Should We Learn From Boston? (testimony of Arthur L. Kellermann), 1. 
156 Ron Golan, Dror Soffer, Adi Givon, and Kobi Peleg, “The Ins and Outs of Terrorist Bus 
Explosions: Injury Profiles of Onboard Explosions Versus Explosions Occurring Adjacent to a Bus,” Injury 
45, no. (2013): 39–43. 
157 What Should We Learn From Boston? (testimony of Arthur L. Kellermann), 2. 
158 Ibid., 2. 
159 Atul Gawande, “Why Boston’s Hospitals Were Ready,” The New Yorker, April 17, 2013, 
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-bostons-hospitals-were-ready 
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for emergency vehicles, while those with medical training began triaging victims.160 
Kellermann considered these courageous civilians the true first responders. 
A few years before the marathon bombings occurred, more than 700 of the city’s 
pre-hospital and hospital-based responders learned the basics of blast-injury care at a city-
wide “Tales of Our Cities” anti-terrorism conference hosted by (then) Boston EMS director 
Rich Serino and sponsored by the Center for Disease Control (CDC).161 Speakers from 
Madrid, London, Mumbai, and other global cities that have been targets of terrorism 
described how each specific incident unfolded, how they managed the response, and what 
they would do differently.162 Lessons learned from the conference were subsequently 
woven into the city’s response plan. Every hospital that received casualties had a well-
crafted disaster plan that had been exercised prior to the event and was ready to put into 
action the day of the event.163  
Kellermann maintains that FEMA needs to develop and maintain a set of valid and 
reliable performance measures that can be used to track progress made, identify areas for 
improvement, and assist in the development of appropriate accountability systems.164 In 
addition, FEMA needs to develop a representation of ROI that can be understood and 
accepted by Congress and the public. In this vein, Kellermann makes three 
recommendations that focus on strengthening preparedness research, grant-making, and 
partnerships. 
Kellermann suggests (a) employing a risk-based approach to setting priorities, (b) 
enhancing coordination by forming an interagency working group, and (c) implementing a 
simple process to categorize and track current and future preparedness research projects so 
officials can easily determine which agency is funding what, and quickly disseminate key 
findings.165 This will assist with the translation of research to the front lines and shorten 
160 What Should We Learn From Boston? (testimony of Arthur L. Kellermann), 2 
161 Smith JF Doctors Share Expertise on Handling Terror Attacks, The Boston Globe, June 15,  
162 What Should We Learn From Boston? (testimony of Arthur L. Kellermann), 2. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid., 7. 
165 Ibid., 8. 
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the feedback loop to the research community. An example of the process would be the 
development of a standardized, searchable format for “after-action” reports.166 
Going forward, grant-making should be more focused on results and should specify 
the desired capabilities and outcomes.167 To compare the current state of grant-making 
with a desired state, Kellermann uses the analogy of monitoring every test or therapy a 
doctor orders against the outcomes he or she achieves. 
Finally, Kellermann strongly suggests strengthening partnerships with industry 
regulators who can assist in the development and implementation of preparedness 
capabilities.168 Such preparedness capabilities could then be aligned with industry 
performance measures. 
Senator Coburn reinforced Kellermann’s perspective by pointing out that Congress 
has the responsibility to look not just at a few good examples but at the grant programs as 
a whole.169 At a time when grant dollars are shrinking, Senator Coburn begs an important 
question: do Congress and FEMA need to do more to align grant funds with concrete 
activities that work, such as using models to ensure objective decisions are made when 
allocating resources for risk/vulnerability reduction. 
It is important to note at this point that while capabilities-building for preplanned 
special events and predictable, naturally-occurring events can be a critical factor in a 
successful response, it is a short-term investment strategy and does little to prepare the 
country for large-scale terrorist events that can have wide-ranging effects across our vast 
network of critical assets. An attack on America’s key infrastructure networks could have 
devastating, long-term consequences; accordingly, a long-term funding strategy needs to 
be developed to protect such assets. 
 
166 Ibid.  
167 Brian Jackson, Kay Sullivan Faith, and Henry Willis, Are We Prepared? Using Reliability Analysis 
to Evaluate Emergency Response Systems (Santa Monica, CA. RAND Corp., 2011), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201100141.html  
168 What Should We Learn From Boston? (testimony of Arthur L. Kellermann), 8. 
169 Coburn, Safety at Any Price. 
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE ROI STRATEGY: MODEL-BASED RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
The exclusivity in DHS’ risk methodology and management may enable DHS to 
prove that, by building capabilities, an urban area or state can reduce its risk for predictable, 
natural events and/or preplanned special events, and calculate an ROI for short-term 
investing. An in-depth, holistic MBRA with limited generalities may assist in developing 
an ROI strategy; the purpose of the MBRA methodology is to support objective decision-
making regarding allocating resources for reducing risk and/or vulnerabilities.170 The 
network analysis tool uses an engineering modeling technique to represent all possible 
faults to related parts of a system, and then determines how to best allocate resources to 
those parts to minimize overall risk.171 This differs from DHS’ analysis, which is goal-
based according to a theory of action, beginning with a pre-specified set of capabilities 
aligned to program goals. 
A. DEFINITION OF ROI 
If a threat or hazard can be mitigated and risk can be reduced, that reduction should 
be measurable. Suppose the cost of reducing or eliminating risk (E) is known. The 
effectiveness of investing E can be calculated as an ROI. ROI is simply the difference in 
risk before and after investing E, divided by investment E. This is written in Eq. 5: 
 ROI = ∆R/E Eq. 5 
representing the benefits derived as a reduction in risk or the “biggest bang for the buck.” 
Risk reduction can be achieved by reducing threat (T), vulnerability (V), 
consequence (C), or all three, and through a variety of methods. Politics, layered defense, 
or improved intelligence may reduce intent, which in turn reduces threat. Target hardening, 
redundancy, and resiliency all reduce vulnerability. Faster and more capable rescue, 
response, and planning all reduce consequence. 
170 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security, Defending a Networked 
Nation (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 107.  
171 Ibid., 146–147. 
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When funds are limited, ROI analysis can be utilized to make decisions. DHS refers 
to this as risk-informed decision making, and the resulting strategy as a risk-informed 
strategy. But how does one reduce risk when resources are limited? Risk-informed strategy 
requires that one estimate risk for all assets threatened by human-caused or natural 
disasters, rank the assets from highest to lowest level of risk, and invest in the highest-risk 
asset first. One must then work down the list, and when money runs out, stop. This strategy 
can apply to both prevention and response. However, risk-ranking is not optimal because 
it does not guarantee the best ROI. 
This chapter presents Lewis’s MBRA method of vulnerability and risk assessment. 
His approach is based on network theory and fault tree technology that uses estimates of 
cost and the probability of an attack to compute an investment strategy aimed at reducing 
risk. Lewis’s concept is to allocate resources in an optimal ROI fashion such that the overall 
risk is minimized. The argument is that the objective for reducing risk (to eliminate 
vulnerabilities or simply prevent the worst thing from happening) will present itself.  
This method of assessment is based on sound principles of logic, probability, and 
cost minimization.172 MBRA provides the policy maker with a scientific answer to the 
question “what is worthwhile protecting, and for how much?” MBRA combines asset 
identification with quantitative analysis to reach a policy decision.173 It tells the decision 
maker how much money to spend on protecting the most critical components of the 
infrastructure. By securing the most critical components of the infrastructure, communities 
are assuring that they can reduce risk and become more resilient to all hazards. 
This thesis assumes that critical infrastructure can be understood, analyzed, and 
protected using a network theory approach. For example, to secure the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) commuter rail system of Washington, 
D.C., one must secure the metro stations in which a majority of the rail lines converge (i.e., 
Metro Center as represented by the rail map). Networks can also be represented as 
mathematical graphs containing nodes and links and depicting which nodes are 
172 Ibid., ix. 
173 Ibid., 107. 
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connected.174 Infrastructure such as electrical power, telecommunications, transportation, 
and water (what some consider the life sectors) can be modeled as networks as depicted in 
Figure 2. Then these networks can be analyzed rigorously to identify assets that may be at 
risk.175 Lewis’s five-step process is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Figure 2.  WMATA Rail Map176 
174 Ibid., 77. 
175 Ibid.  
176 “WMATA Rail Map,” accessed December 12, 2014, 
https://search.yahoo.com/search?fr=mcafee&type=B211US756D20110304&p=WMATA+Rail+map 
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B. UTILIZING FAULT TREE ANALYSIS WITHIN MBRA 
To begin to understand the how a sector can be evaluated for funding strategies, 
MBRA utilizes the development of a fault tree, which is a model of what happens to the 
sector when a threat turns into a fault.177 A threat is an entity that wants to attack a sector 
component;178 a fault is a failure or failure mode caused by a malfunction, or natural or 
manmade event; and vulnerability is a measure of the likelihood that a fault will occur. A 
vulnerability is defined as the probability of a threat-induced fault making vulnerability 
equal to fault probability or  
V(i) = Probability (i) = Probability that an attack by threat (i) will succeed179 
So vulnerability is a probability that measures the susceptibility of a component to a 
threat.180   
A fault tree is simply a model of the components of a critical node or sector, 
organized as a hierarchy or tree-structured graph.181 The nodes of the tree are called 
components, logic gates, and threats. A component is any major asset of the sector, such 
as a water treatment plant, electrical power transformer, and telecommunication hotel.182 
The root of the fault tree is a special component that represents the entire sector. A threat 
is any physical or cyber-threat to a sector component. A fault occurs when a threat is 
activated and successfully damages one or more components of the sector.183 So, the 
purpose of the fault tree is to model what happens to the sector when a threat turns into a 
fault.184 Also, the logical relationships among threats and the vulnerabilities of components 
in a sector can all be captured using a fault tree. The output from the fault tree is a list of 
vulnerabilities that will occur, potentially allowing for the mapping of future long-term 




181 Ibid., 113.  
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid.  
184 Ibid. 
 50 
                                                 
funding strategies. To prove that a fault tree can begin to identify potential short-term 
funding strategies, the Boston Marathon incident is reviewed. In the next section, the 
marathon route is evaluated against the IED attack. 
C. SHORT-TERM STRATEGY EXAMPLE: PREVENTATIVE SECURITY 
AND PLANNED SPECIAL EVENTS 
An IED is the detonation of an explosive device on or near a target and can be 
produced in varying sizes, functioning methods, containers, and delivery methods (e.g., 
person, vehicle, or projectile). IEDs are particularly effective against unarmored civilian 
targets. For this reason, they are often employed at locations where large populations 
gather, such as the starting and/or finish line of the Boston Marathon, a crowded special 
event. Furthermore, IEDs are designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. The 
extent of the damage is determined by the type and quantity of explosive. Effects are 
generally static, other than cascading consequences (unintended effects), such as 
incremental structural failure. Exacerbating conditions include ease of access to the target, 
lack of barriers/shielding, poor construction, and ease of concealment of the device (see 
Figure 3).185 
The preponderance of assessment indicates that IED attacks against crowds during 
special events, such as the Boston Marathon, are the most likely threat. Such attacks require 
relatively little sophistication in terms of material acquisition and coordinated planning. In 
addition, the knowledge and methodologies of specific IED attacks are widely available 
via the Internet to a variety of potential aggressors. Though ultimately less significant than 
many other forms of attack, repeated or strategically timed IED attacks could well create 
significant and persistent disruptions in normative operations. 
185 Global Security, “Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs)/ Booby Traps,” accessed November 28, 2014, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied.htm 
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Figure 3.  Boston Marathon Route Fault Tree 
The fault tree represented in Figure 3 depicts the Boston Marathon route itself as 
the sector and utilizes an IED scenario as the threat. The vulnerabilities associated with the 
infrastructure (the marathon route itself) indicate that preventative measures in the form of 
a layered defense, such as ticketing and screening guests at areas where crowds form (start 
and finish lines), establishing security screenings for parade-route entry points, and 
prohibiting items such as backpacks could have reduced the probability that the threat 
would succeed, or mitigated the resulting damage. Note that it is irrelevant whether the 
attack is by a participant in the marathon (e.g., suicide belt, backpack, or remote detonation) 
or a bystander; while the threat itself may be slightly different, the affected components 
and outcomes are identical. 
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D. ROI ASSESSMENT FOR PREVENTATIVE SECURITY 
Fault tree analysis requires the analyst to estimate four inputs for each threat/asset 
pair (leaves of the tree): threat, vulnerability, consequence, and cost of preventative 
measures. The cost associated with such preventative measures can be calculated by 
estimating the costs associated with the establishment of checkpoints with metal detectors 
at both the start and finish lines and the additional law enforcement personal needed for 
such checkpoints. In order to screen approximately 10,000 spectators at both the start and 
finish lines, approximately seven check points with three individual stations each (one 
station equates to one metal detector and two law enforcement professionals) would be 
able to screen all individuals in under two hours. This is based on the assumption that 240 
individuals could be screened per station per hour.186 A total of 42 law enforcement 
professionals (two for each of the 21 stations) would be needed for a 12-hour shift. The 
mean average hourly rate for a law enforcement official in the Boston area is $28.45.187 
Since the marathon occurred on a holiday, law enforcement professionals would have 
received time-and-half, equating to $42.68 per hour. The total cost for additional law 
enforcement professionals would be approximately $21,511, or $2.15 per individual 
entering the areas near the start and finish lines. If walk-through metal detectors would 
need to be purchased (at approximately $4,000 per detector188), this would add $84,000 to 
the screening costs (for one detector at each of the 21 stations) for a total cost of $105,521, 
or $10.50 per individual entering the areas near the start and finish lines. This equates to 
an ROI of 796,050 percent if 140 lives were not seriously injured. This is a significant 
increase in a ROI compared to the 469 percent ROI associated with FEMA’s capabilities 
building. Risk will decrease significantly with the utilization of preventative measures due 
to the decrease in vulnerability associated with the targets (start and finish lines).   
186 Dallas Fort Worth International Airport Planning Department, Security Checkpoints Tiger Team 
2005, Improving Throughput, rev. (Dallas Fort Worth, TX: Dallas Fort Worth International Airport 
Planning Department, 2006), 3.  
187 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Occupational Employment and Wages,” May 2013, 
http://www.bls.gov/OES/current/oes333051.htm  
188 U.S. Department of Justice, “Walk-Through Metal Detectors for Personnel,” September 1999, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/school/ch3a_5.html  
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In comparison, the security and preparedness costs for President Obama’s 2009 
inauguration were approximately $38.825 million for the District of Columbia,189 for an 
estimated crowd of 1.8 million spectators. This equates to $26.11 per spectator. More 
specifically, the costs associated with the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police 
Department (MPD) and other law enforcement brought in to assist the day of the 
inauguration was approximately $20,907,354.190 This equates to approximately $11.62 
per-individual. All preventative measures, including ticketing of individuals associated 
with certain vulnerable areas, restricting backpacks, and the screening of individuals, were 
incorporated into the security plan.191 
E. LONG-TERM STRATEGY EXAMPLE: POWER LINES AND NATURAL 
DISASTERS 
An understanding of long-term investment in networks and associated 
vulnerabilities would have been extremely effective for the electric and gas subsector prior 
to super storm Sandy. According to Atlantic City Electric (ACE), more than 8 million 
customers across the northeastern U.S. lost power as a result of Sandy. In their initial 
reports to the New Jersey Bureau of Public Utilities (BPU), companies in the electric and 
gas subsector described the profound impact of the storm. Statements from Public Service 
Electric and Gas (PSE&G) and Jersey Central Power and Light (JCP&L) sum up the 
challenges faced by the entire subsector. PSE&G’s statement read, in part: 
This weather event will rank as the worst in PSE&G’s history in terms of 
the number of customers without service, with a preliminary estimate 
indicating that 1.98 million or 90% of the company’s 2.2 million electric 
customers experienced an extended interruption of service. Sandy 
interrupted power to one-third of PSE&G’s transmission circuits, damaged 
2,400 utility poles, and 48,000 [downed] trees. 
189 Government of the District of Columbia, Proposed Budget and Financial Plan, Volume 1, 
Executive Summary, FY 2010 Meeting the Challenge (Washington, DC: Government of the District of 
Columbia, 2008), F-5.  
190 The author of this thesis developed the overall District budget associated with President Obama’s 
2009 inauguration.  
191 The author of this thesis was part of the Inaugural Planning Committee for the District of 
Columbia that assisted in the development of the security plan for the 2009 Presidential Inauguration.  
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JCP&L’s statement discussed the challenges of restoration, given the breadth of 
damage to its infrastructure: 
Due to the extreme force of Sandy, 1,100 of JCP&L’s 1200 circuits were 
damaged, and ultimately, 786 of those circuits were quarantined. In many 
areas, line workers rebuilt the electrical system. For example, JCP&L serves 
over 230 municipalities and in some of those towns over 300 poles needed 
to be replaced. Restoration efforts were challenged by thousands of downed 
trees, fallen branches and other debris as well as flooding from heavy rain. 
Also, the Nor’easter brought additional challenges in the form of 12 inches 
of heavy wet snow to some areas. Damage was so severe that approximately 
65,000 trees were cut and cleared to restore power, 34,000 hazard locations 
were identified and over 19,000 cross-arms, 6,700 poles, 3,600 transformers 
and 400 miles of wire were damaged. 
Rockland Electric Company’s (RECO) statement revealed the impact Sandy had 
on its customer base: 
There were 1,239 ‘no power incidents’ affecting 75,122 customers 
throughout the RECO Service Territory over the course of the storm. Many 
customers were affected more than once during the event due to switching 
and for safety reasons while making permanent repairs to the system….The 
preliminary data indicates these outages break down by cause and 
customers affected, as follows: 
• Tree Contact—614 interruptions, affecting 53,230 customers; 
• Equipment Failure—34 interruptions, affecting 3,909 customers; 
• No Cause Found—341 interruptions, affecting 11,103 customers; 
• Non-Company Accidents—one interruption, affecting two 
customers; 
• Unknown—249 Interruptions, affecting 6,878 customers. 
The electric and gas subsectors said they faced challenges in working with the 
various layers and units of government during the response and recovery phase of the 
emergency. Coordination and communication with municipal and county offices of 
emergency management proved challenging. Although electric and gas utilities are 
required to provide a representative to county OEMs, this requirement does not extend to 
municipal OEMs. This gap in coverage impeded coordination of the overall response. The 
utilities were confident in the knowledge level and professionalism of their representatives, 
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but breakdowns in coordination and communication occurred at the county level 
nevertheless. 
Participants also reported that the management of local government expectations 
was challenging. Specifically, at the municipal level―where, in some cases, the entire 
infrastructure had to be replaced―a lack of understanding about the restoration of service 
created unrealistic expectations about how quickly service could be restored. One major 
theme expressed was the importance of educating government officials at all levels about 
electric and gas infrastructure and the complexity of restoring power after a disaster. 
It was also noted that the storm had greater impact on equipment and industrial 
control systems when there were single points of failure. Pre-identifying single points of 
failure before a disaster event could potentially prevent cascading problems. This was 
particularly true for the Sewaren electrical substation. This particular substation distributed 
power to all oil refineries in New Jersey. Due to the storm surge, the substation was 
flooded, and New Jersey and New York City lost all capability to refine and pump 
petroleum. However, PSE&G noted that the switch was not in the 100-year flood zone and 
had therefore not been considered as vulnerable as it ultimately proved to be. 
The U.S. must begin to investigate the development of long-term investment 
strategies for critical infrastructure, such as replacing the above-ground electrical 
distribution systems with below-ground systems. With the increased number of severe 
storms affecting the U.S., such as Hurricane Sandy, evaluating ROI utilizing Lewis’s 
MBRA will be critical if the electrical companies and the consumer are to support such an 
investment. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The following question needs to be answered, “Given the limited budget for 
protecting networks and building capabilities, how best should the money be spent?” This 
step will require the derivation of an investment strategy that removes or diminishes the 
likelihood of faults occurring in the networks if hazardous events occur and determines the 
capabilities needed for the jurisdiction to respond adequately and become more resilient. 
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If a jurisdiction decides not to diminish a fault or build a capability, the reasoning 
associated with this decision needs to be documented and reevaluated on an annual basis. 
Due to the cost limitation associated with securing America’s infrastructure, this 
thesis supports the utilization of MBRA as a short- and long-term homeland security 
strategy. America must begin to analyze its infrastructure, understand its vulnerabilities, 
and develop infrastructure that is hardened. But for such a strategy to be successful, the 
investors (i.e., the American public) need to understand the ROI. The success of such a 
strategy lies in making homeland security part of the American culture and not just a 
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V. THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTMENT: 
INFORMED DECISION-MAKING BY THE PUBLIC 
Since 2003, DHS has awarded more than $16.3 billion through SHSP and UASI 
grants to enhance the capabilities within states and urban areas.192 The cost of maintaining 
these additional or enhanced capabilities must be absorbed by local operating budgets, but 
when facing difficult fiscal conditions, state and local governments may reduce their level 
of contribution towards public safety and, consequently, homeland security preparedness, 
to address competing priorities. States, urban areas, and jurisdictions need to find 
alternative means to raise capital to maintain current capabilities and manage risk. 
Both governmental and nongovernmental players have begun experimenting with 
collaborative dialogue on how to afford homeland security needs.193 These experiments 
range from public agencies pulling together stakeholders for joint discussions of issues, to 
full-fledged consensus-building efforts, to design funding proposals for action.194 These 
efforts are hoping to build a shared identity as a starting place for change and heal 
community rifts through building trust and finding a shared homeland security reality.195 
Crowdfunding and bonding homeland security needs can produce informed homeland 
security ROI strategies and support citizens’ desires for meaningful roles in the country’s 
response to terrorism. Such ROI strategies may also allow leadership to solve some 
negative perception issues and convince citizens that they have homeland security 
responsibilities. This thesis suggests crowdfunding and bonding, as an experiment in public 
collaboration for homeland security initiatives beyond legally mandated forums. 
192 Hearing before Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness 
(testimony of Ann L. Richards). 
193 Innes, and Booher, Planning with Complexity. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid.  
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A. CROWDFUNDING 
Crowdsourcing and crowdfunding are collective efforts of individuals who network 
and pool their resources, usually via the Internet, to support efforts initiated by other people 
or organizations.196 It can involve collecting intellectual support, data, opinions, financial 
capital, or other forms of assistance. Working within a multitude allows each individual 
member the benefits of being contributor, but makes it easy by requiring only a small 
contribution from each person. A small contribution may mean a few minutes of one’s time 
to forward emails or provide an opinion, a minor effort such as dropping off donations, or 
a small financial donation (according to Crowd Fund Capital Advisors, a group that 
provides strategy and technology expertise to investors, the average crowdfunding 
donation is $80197). Crowdfunding can also refer to the funding of a company by selling 
small amounts of equity to many investors. Moreover, crowdfunding investment ideas have 
been drawing buzz around the nation since Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act and the bill was signed into law by President Obama in April 2012.198 
The new legislation was developed to help entrepreneurs and small businesses raise capital 
directly from individuals online. Crowdfunding companies, such as RocketHub, 
Kickstarter, and Indiegogo, have drawn media attention to the idea of donation/reward-
style fundraising campaigns. Crowdsourcing and crowdfunding offer strong elements of 
social networking by opening the discussion, feedback, and funding processes to the 
general public, which builds in transparency and trust—two of the key factors missing 
within today’s homeland security construct. 
196 Wikipedia, s.v., “Crowdfunding, accessed July 23, 2014, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowd_funding. Merriam Webster Dictionary defines crowdfunding as “the 
practice of soliciting financial contributions from a large number of people especially from the online 
community.” Merriam Webster Dictionary, s.v., “Crowdfunding,” accessed July 23, 2014, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crowdfunding 
197 Jason Best, and Sherwood Neiss, “Crowdfund Investing—Trick or Treat? Crowdfund Capital 
Investors Isn’t the Bogeyman Some Would Have to Believe,” October 29, 2012, 
http://www.crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/blog/crowdfund-investment/108-crowdfund-investing-trick-or-
treat-cfi-isn-t-the-bogeyman-some-would-have-you-believe.html  
198 Securities and Exchange Commission, Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation 
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2012/33-9354.pdf 
 60 
                                                 
Sherwood Neiss, entrepreneur, in testimony before the subcommittee on the Threat 
Awareness and Reporting Program (TARP), Financial Services, and Bailouts of Public and 
Private Programs in the U.S. House of Representatives on September 15, 2011, equated 
crowdfunding with a college football team. He stated, “The team is not in the majors, and 
it takes a good team and a solid fan base to propel the team to the championship. In 
crowdfunding, the fans are the investors that, more likely than not, know the players and 
rally around them, providing strategies, experience, and money, not so they can pay their 
way to the big game but so they can launch a company that will benefit the entire 
community.”199  
Such opportunities to engage knowledgeable stakeholders and benefit the whole 
community present themselves when proposing new and innovative homeland security 
initiatives for the local community. 
In August 2012, AppsBlogger looked at a total of 45,815 Kickstarter projects and 
nearly $215 million in pledged funds. The study found that only 54 percent of completed 
projects had succeeded.200 If only about half of these crowdfunding projects succeed, why 
are people not raising concerns, but instead pledging more via platforms like Kickstarter 
than ever before? The answer is simple—people inherently want to be part of a community, 
and they want recognition for it. People are drawn to crowdfunding because they are 
capitalists at heart. According to the Sustainable Economies Law Center, the success of 
crowdfunding sites demonstrates the desire of members of the public to support projects 
they believe in; the possibility of financial return only reinforces this economically healthy 
impulse.201 Crowdfunding is more than just money; it is facilitation, dedication, team 
building, and valuation. These are the ingredients needed to make a new homeland security 
199 Best, and Neiss, “Crowdfund Investing—Trick or Treat?” 
200 “News on Kickstarter—About 41% of the Projects Fail,” August 3, 2012, 
http://edithosb.wordpress.com/2012/08/03/kickstarter/ 
201 Elizabeth M. Murphy, “Petition for Rulemaking, Exempt Security Offerings up to $100,000 with 




                                                 
reality that is relevant to the current global fiscal scenario and meets the consumer’s need 
for involvement. 
The AppsBlogger review of Kickstarter also defined some potential measures for 
successful funding; one is the lower the cost, the more likely the project is to succeed. In 
2012, the average funded Kickstarter project cost was $10,000, although 17 of the projects 
funded on this platform alone were over $1 million.202 Today, $10,000 remains a 
reasonable goal for successful Kickstarter projects, and to-date, 82 of their projects have 
reached six or seven figures.203 Forbes also supports the claim that successful 
crowdfunding projects set a reasonable financial goal, and meet that goal within the first 
30 to 40 days.204 This bodes well for projects on smaller, neighborhood and municipal 
scales, and suggests that breaking large projects into smaller, manageable goals may be 
prudent in order to obtain funding in a timely manner.  
It is also notable that a surprising percentage of funded projects on Kickstarter 
(8.5 percent) received more than double their financial goal, reaching over 200 percent of 
requested funding.205 On Indiegogo, 87 percent of funded projects exceed their goal, by 
an average of 31 percent.206 Because the public can see that a project has already reached 
its goal, and yet continues to pledge, this suggests again that people are more than willing 
to support efforts they see as necessary or good. 
202 “News on Kickstarter—About 41% of the Projects Fail.” 
203 Ibid. 
204 Chance Barnett, “Donation-based Crowdfunding Sites: Kickstarter vs. Indiegogo,” Forbes, 
September 9, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/09/donation-based-crowdfunding-
sites-kickstarter-vs-indiegogo/ 
205 “News on Kickstarter—About 41% of the Projects Fail.” 




                                                 
1. Examples in Homeland Security 
Currently, the avenues for public involvement are limited. Immediately after large-
scale disasters, many individuals, looking for a way to be part of the solution, donate items 
to the victims. Donations are so numerous, in fact, that donations management has become 
its own emergency support function in many city and state disaster response plans. In 
particular, people feel a need, or prefer, to donate their used clothing. Unfortunately, most 
clothing is not utilized and instead becomes trash. This results in more work for the local 
first-responding agencies, which now have to manage the resulting trash as well. But what 
if someone developed a business plan to process clothing donations for consignment? The 
proceeds from the clothing sales could then be given directly to the disaster victims. If the 
business plan was posted on a crowdfunding website immediately after the disaster, it 
would maximize the number of potential investors to fund the start-up, capitalizing on press 
and social media coverage of the incident, and the resulting public urge for involvement. 
Funds could even be pledged by the victims themselves, who would receive an ROI for 
their financial contribution through the return of gained profits. This would allow not only 
those unaffected by the disaster to contribute and assist, but it also would allow the victims 
of the disaster to “help themselves,” to be active participants in their own recovery. A 
victim puts money into funding the start-up, unaffected citizens provide donations of 
material goods for sale, victims buy needed items (perhaps at deep discounts, while others 
buy at consignment prices), and victims receive the proceeds/profits from the remaining 
sales. 
Another hypothetical example of homeland security crowdfunding could be an 
additional security fee added to the ticket of a large event such as the Boston Marathon or 
the Presidential Inauguration. Such a fee (comparable to the size and magnitude of the 
event) could allow for preventative measures to be put in place so that the threat and 
vulnerabilities are reduced; ultimately, this would reduce the overall risk to the individual 
spectator. Large cities around the country have begun to re-evaluate the cost of a permit 
for special events to be inclusive of preventative measures. Such cost is then redirected to 
the individual spectator or participant as an additional fee (a form of crowdfunding). 
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The significant capabilities and benefits of crowdsourcing were exemplified in 
December 2009 by a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
competition.207 To mark the fortieth anniversary of the ARPANet, precursor to today’s 
Internet, DARPA announced the DARPA Network Challenge. The challenge was to be the 
first to submit the locations (i.e., latitude and longitude coordinates) of 10 moored, 8-foot, 
red, weather balloons at separate, previously undisclosed, fixed locations in the continental 
U.S. The balloons would be in readily accessible locations (e.g., parks or public squares) 
and visible from nearby roads. Because of the potentially wide geographic distribution of 
the balloons (actual locations were: two in California, and one each in Arizona, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) and short preparation time 
(DARPA announced the challenge one month before the contest start), any strategy 
necessitated use of the Internet for mobilization and intelligence gathering. The focus of 
the competition was to explore how broad problems can be tackled using Internet tools, 
specifically, and most importantly to this discussion, what role social networking can play 
in the team building and urgent mobilization required for time-critical needs. Researchers 
hoped to gain insight on basic issues such as collaboration and trust in diverse social 
networking constructs.208 
The winning team, comprised of five students from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), found all 10 balloons in less than nine hours. Their performance 
roundly beat the other 4,000 individual participants in the challenge and shocked DARPA, 
which had scheduled the competition for a full week. Incredibly, the team learned of the 
contest only four days before it started. In less than two days they had a plan, a website, 
and more than 5,400 people signed up to help them.209 In less than one week, five students 
constructed a productive, precise, layered, networked enterprise involving thousands of 
citizens. 
207 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA], “DARPA Network Challenge,” accessed 
July 13, 2013, http://archive.darpa.mil/networkchallenge/  
208 Ibid.  
209 Lance Whitney, “MIT Floats Ideas in DARPA Balloon Challenge,” CNET News, December 8, 
2009, http://www.cnet.com/news/mit-floats-ideas-in-darpa-balloon-challenge-q-a/ 
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Rather than develop a platform, or use any specific existing platform for 
networking, the MIT team created a simple website, inviting participants to join, outlining 
their strategy, and encouraging the use of any and all social networking platforms. In their 
example illustrating how it might work, they cited possibilities such as email, Facebook, 
and Twitter. At the core of their strategy was an incentive network model, which was 
developed to encourage social networking of interested people. DARPA offered a total of 
$40,000 in prize money, which the MIT team allocated equally among the 10 balloons 
($4,000 each).210 The team incentivized individuals by offering $2,000 to the person who 
found each balloon. They also allocated $1,000 to the person that referred the balloon 
finder to their website. Then they gave $500 to the person who referred the referrer, $250 
to the person that referred them, and so on. This recursive incentive structure essentially 
propagated itself over existing social networks (e.g., Twitter) as planned. Rather than 
seeing others as competitors, people were incentivized to get as many friends working for 
the MIT team as possible, resulting in 5,000+ “workers” in less than two days.211 
Although no other competitor found all 10 balloons, there were several contestants 
who successfully located most of the balloons. The strategies employed by other teams and 
individuals included creating Facebook groups, directly recruiting from social media 
website groups, utilizing Twitter feeds, and other crowdsourcing techniques. The winning 
team’s ace was the undiminished incentive within each subsequent layer of network modes, 
which ensured that the social media interest, activity, and impact was more sustained. 
However, one participant showed that even a more long-term, sustained interest is not 
necessary to generate enough activity to get the job done; it may be just as possible with a 
short-term, more focused burst. George Hotz posted a tweet one hour before the start of 
the competition, but even with only one hour of preparation, Hotz located eight balloons—
four directly from his network of 50,000 Twitter followers.212  
210 Ibid. 
211 Christopher M. Ford, “Twitter, Facebook and the Ten Red Balloons: Social Network Problem 
Solving and Homeland Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, (February 2011): 1–8. 
212 DARPA, “Network Challenge Project Report,” 10. 
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Another entry with interesting relevance was the iNeighbors team, which included 
only members of an existing social media site for neighborhood watch communities; they 
did not market or recruit new participants for the challenge. The goal of iNeighbors was to 
see how successful an existing network of local users would be. The team successfully 
located five of the 10 balloons within the nine-hour timeframe.213 Each of these examples 
has a particular relevance, but the larger question is whether the DARPA challenge can 
correlate into a means of funding homeland security needs and incentivizing people to 
participate. 
What the challenge clearly demonstrates is the efficacy crowdsourcing and the 
power of social media in distributing information and mobilizing people very quickly, all 
of which are important to the idea of crowdfunding homeland security needs. In regards to 
incentivizing participation, it is important to note the MIT team’s conjecture that people 
take an active and willing role only if they feel the goal is something good and moral, and 
that conversely, people are reluctant to participate or recruit participants if they have doubts 
or mistrust about the purpose.214 Alexander Petland, Director of the MIT Human Dynamics 
Laboratory and the professor who collaborated with the team, takes it a step further by 
hypothesizing that some efforts would fare better with a completely altruistic end-goal.215 
These ideas will play an important role in the discussions of how and why crowdfunding 
is a viable solution to homeland security funding. 
B. BONDS 
In addition to crowdfunding, bonding can be successfully employed to fund 
homeland security. Municipal bonds are issued by state and local governments, also called 
municipalities, to raise money for public works projects like the construction and 
maintenance of bridges, hospitals, schools, and water treatment facilities, or maintaining 
and enhancing the current level of security. A bond issuer (the municipality) sells the bond 
213 Ibid., 11. 
214 Ibid., 14. 




                                                 
to the bond holder (the investor). The bond holder lends the issuer a fixed amount of 
money for a certain amount of time in exchange for regularly scheduled interest payments. 
Municipal bonds are one of the safest long-term investments. Because they are so secure, 
they usually carry interest rates that average a percentage point or two below the going rate 
for Treasury bills. But in early 2008, the interest rate for municipal bonds crept higher than 
that of Treasury bills and remains higher today. This makes municipal bonds attractive 
investments because they are exempt from federal, state, and local income taxes, if one 
lives in the issuing municipality. Since 1913, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has 
allowed investors to withhold paying income tax on any earnings from municipal bonds. 
So when interest rates for municipal bonds are higher than those for Treasury bills, the 
local citizen earns significantly more, especially since he or she will not pay taxes on those 
earnings, and the purchase of the bonds allows him or her to feel a direct relationship with 
building and securing the community. 
Similarly to crowdsourcing, where participants have a need to perceive a good and 
moral end-goal for a bonding alternative to be successful, citizens must perceive the 
strategy as fair and equitable. The central assumptions around equity theory (Adams, 1963; 
Homans, 1961; Walster, Walster and Bercheid, 1978) are that people strive for justice in 
their social relations, and they experience anxiety when they see themselves in unjust 
relationships. 
C. WHY CROWDFUNDING/BONDING WILL WORK 
At the core of crowdfunding and/or bonding is the concept of effective change in 
both the perceptions and the actions of the general public. However, attempting to change 
perceptions and actions is not always easy, and there are multiple pitfalls that are often 
anti-intuitive. Social scientists point to three common myths associated with making 
effective change. This section of the thesis discusses these myths and why crowdfunding 
and bonding avoid these mistakes and instead can be effective strategies for facilitating 
change. 
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1. Myth1: Education Changes Behavior   
The first myth of effective change is that education will change behavior. It has 
been proven time and again that information is not enough to make effective change occur. 
Rather, information needs to be tangible, personalized, and accompanied by interaction. In 
2008, almost seven years after 9/11, survey data utilizing a nationally representative 
probability sample of several thousand American adults suggests that nearly two thirds felt 
the government had failed to provide, or clearly explain, ways for average citizens to play 
a role or participate in their country’s defense against terrorism.216 Most respondents (66 
percent) said that government had failed to clearly explain citizens’ roles in the country’s 
fight against terrorism and even more (74 percent) that government had failed to adequately 
explain how to prepare for acts of terrorism.217 In the years following 9/11, aside from 
military enlistment, opportunities for civic engagement associated directly with the threat 
of terror seemed largely confined to citizen vigilance, such as the nationwide “If You See 
Something, Say Something” public awareness campaign. 
Interviewed on the eve of the Iraq War troop surge, President Bush was asked why 
he had not “asked more Americans and more American interests to sacrifice something,” 
in particular, sacrifices that would “muster support” and would involve Americans “in the 
struggle.”218 In response, President Bush referred to his earlier call for volunteerism with 
USA Freedom Corps and asserted that he strongly opposed what were apparently the 
primary potential forms of sacrifice considered after 9/11: compulsory military service and 
tax increases.219 
Crowdfunding and/or bonding homeland security long-term investments will 
mandate that homeland security proposals are tangible, personalized, and interactive 
through the use of MBRA. As shown earlier, MBRA provides a scientific answer to the 
216 Moghaddam, and Breckenridge, “The Post-Tragedy.” 
217 Ibid.  
218 Ibid. 
219 Jim Lehrer, “President Bush Defends Decision to Send Additional Troops to Iraq,” interview by 
Jim Lehrer, PBS NewsHour, January 16, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/newshours/bb/white_house/jan-
june07/bush_01-16.html 
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question “what is worthwhile protecting, and for how much?” MBRA combines asset 
identification with quantitative analysis to reach a policy decision.220 It tells the public how 
much money to spend on protecting the most critical infrastructure components. By 
securing the most critical components of the infrastructure, communities are assured that 
they can reduce risk and become more resilient to all hazards. MBRA makes homeland 
security spending tangible and provides visible ROI. 
2. Myth 2: Attitude Changes Behavior 
The second myth of effective change is that one needs to change one’s attitude to 
change one’s behavior. Instead, if behavior expectations are set, the corresponding attitude 
will follow. Homeland security strategies presented thus far by DHS have focused on local, 
state, and or federal government. Even with the PPD-8 “whole community” concept, one 
has yet to see how the local citizen (the consumer) is involved unless “whole community” 
refers only to local public safety officials. DHS has never set expectations for individual 
citizens. In contrast, crowdsourcing, crowdfunding, and bonding set behavior expectations 
by placing authority over what occurs or does not occur into the hands of the individual 
citizen. Citizens are expected to express their interest regarding the homeland security 
concept or strategies being presented, by either contributing or voting “yes” or not 
contributing and voting “no.” The expectation is that the citizen needs to be involved in 
decision-making, and both crowdfunding and bonding allow for such involvement. 
3. Myth 3: People Know What Motivates Them to Take Action 
The third and final myth of effective change is that people know what motivates 
them to take action. However, social scientists believe that people actually do not know 
what motivates them; people are motivated by other people’s actions or by social norms.221 
Crowdfunding and bonding allow people to demonstrate their interest in protecting their 
community, allow others to witness those demonstrations as they happen, and allow for the 
220 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security, 107. 
221 . Moghaddam, and Breckenridge, “The Post-Tragedy.” 
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maintenance of short- and long-term homeland security strategies as part of the social 
norm. 
4. Historical Perspective on Homeland Security Investments  
For capital to be raised, Americans will need to fulfill the calls for public sacrifice, 
understand the homeland security issues, and vote, if they want their dollars used to support 
the most vital homeland security needs. History suggests that Americans are willing to 
make such sacrifices. A World War II campaign called upon American citizens in all 
income categories to make voluntary contributions through war bonds. The War Bond 
campaign was carefully crafted to create an emotionally compelling sense of civic duty and 
public partnership in the war effort. During an all-day fundraising radio broadcast in 1943, 
the popular singer and celebrity, Kate Smith, explained to her fellow citizens: “When we 
buy War Bonds, we’re not buying tanks and guns and shells and planes. What we’re doing 
is buying our boys back…bringing them home to us, safe and sound once again.”222 The 
call for voluntary contributions through war bond commitments generated approximately 
$98.3 billion by 1945, representing almost half the then gross national product.223 
Another example of American self-sacrifice was the victory garden. Victory 
gardens, also called war gardens or food gardens for defense, were vegetable, fruit, and or 
herb gardens planted at private residences and public parks in the U.S. during World War 
I and World War II to reduce the pressure on the public food supply brought on by the war 
effort. Basic information about gardening appeared in public services booklets distributed 
by the Department of Agriculture, as well as by agribusiness corporations such as 
International Harvester and Beech-Nut. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that 
more than 20 million victory gardens were planted.224 The amount of fruits and vegetables 
harvested from these home and community plots was estimated at 9–10 million tons—an 
amount equal to all commercial production of fresh vegetables at the time. In addition to 
222 James T. Sparrow, “Buying our Boys Back: The Mass Foundations of Fiscal Citizenship in World 
War II,” Journal of Policy History 20, no. 2 (2008): 263.  
223 Ibid.  
224 United States Department of Agriculture, “About Us,” March, 28, 2014, 
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/qlinks/extension.html 
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indirectly aiding the war effort, these gardens were also considered a civil morale booster, 
in that gardeners felt empowered by their contributions of labor and rewarded by the 
produce grown (see Figure 4). All of these benefits made victory gardens a part of daily 
life on the American home front. 
 
Figure 4.  Sow the Seeds of Victory225 
Many aspects of the public’s response to 9/11 followed a similar pattern and 
revealed an opportunity bubble—a promising, yet fleeting, opportunity to shape the course 
of subsequent events.226 In the immediate aftermath, Americans were ready and willing to 
make personal and collective sacrifices. During the first three weeks following the attacks, 
the rate of volunteerism increased more than six standard deviations throughout the 
225 “Sow the Seeds of Victory” [image], accessed November 4, 2014, 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Sow_victory_poster_usgovt.gif 
226 Moghaddam, and Breckenridge, “The Post-Tragedy.” 
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nation.227 Within only three months, charitable donations for 9/11 victims and their 
families exceeded $1.5 billion.228 An extraordinary increase in social capital signaled the 
public’s readiness for civic contribution. Public trust and confidence in government 
reached a 30-year peak in the first few weeks following the attacks229; support for 
leadership was extraordinarily high and widespread. Even prestigious, traditionally 
skeptical newspapers—for example, The New York Times and the Washington Post—were 
uncritically supportive of leadership decisions after 9/11, including the momentous 
decisions to wage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to retrospective scholarly 
analysis.230 
Such self-sacrifice can be explained through pervasive trends in social behavior and 
the relationship between perceived in-group threat and group cohesion.231 War bonds and 
victory gardens during World War II and the increase in volunteerism following 9/11 are 
examples demonstrating this relationship; when individuals perceive a serious threat to the 
in-group (such as from an enemy attack or natural disaster), they show greater solidarity 
with other group members.232 Showing greater solidarity can mean making enormous 
sacrifices in order to support the in-group and demonstrating extraordinary resilience in the 
face of pressures and difficulties. 
Judging correctly when and how to make constructive use of the opportunity-
bubble after a tragedy is a hallmark of great leadership. Enormous potential for civic 
generosity and sacrifice is available at the height of an opportunity-bubble, but leaders must 
choose the types of sacrifices and the timing of calls to action carefully. Timing is of the 
227 Penner et al., “Effects on Volunteering of the September 11, 2001 Attacks.” 
228 Foundation Center, Giving in the Aftermath of 9/11: Foundations and Corporations Respond (New 
York: Foundation Center, 2002), http://www.fdncenter.org/research/trends_analysis/pdf/sept11.pdf 
229 Pew Research Center, “Trust in Government 1958–2010,” in Distrust, Discontent, Anger and 
Partisan Rancor: The People and Their Government (Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press, 2010), 13–22, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1569/trust-in-government-distrust-
discontent-anger-partisan-rancor 
230 Andrew Rojecki, “Rhetorical Alchemy: American Exceptionalism and the War on Terror,” 
Political Communication 25 (2008): 67–88. 
231 Arthur Stein, “Conflict and Cohesion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 20 (1976): 143–172.  
232 Fathali M. Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations (Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association Press, 2008). 
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greatest importance: too early, and people, still reeling from the impact of the tragedy, may 
be unable to respond. Too late, and people may have grown too detached from the tragedy 
and accustomed to no commitment. Even later, people (and the media) may focus 
critically—and perhaps angrily—on leadership’s failure to have asked for more, sooner. 
D. CONCLUSION 
DHS must break through traditional linear methods of relying primarily on formal 
expertise and replace them with nonlinear, socially constructed processes to engage both 
experts and stakeholders.233 Unfortunately, funding decisions have been formulated by 
locally elected homeland security officials from DHS homeland security strategies and 
grant guidance. These officials do not operate on the assumption that there is an optimal 
solution. Instead, they formulate options and consider what the consequences may 
mean.234 What has emerged are unofficial experts, inconsistent determinations of risk, and 
bureaucratic processes at federal, state, and local levels. 
What needs to emerge is a new process of collaborative rationality, exemplified in 
crowdfunding and bonding of homeland security needs. This is an alternative to the 
traditional linear model with its emphasis on expert knowledge and reasoning based upon 
argumentation;235 instead, the affected interested parties jointly engage in face-to-face 
dialogue, bringing their various perspectives to the table to deliberate on the problems they 
face together. All interested parties must also be fully informed and able to express their 
views, and be listened to, whether they are powerful or not. Techniques must be used to 
mutually assure the legitimacy, comprehensibility, sincerity, and accuracy of what is stated 
in order for substantial agreement to be reached among a majority.236 
A social constructionist view, in the form of crowdfunding and bonding homeland 
security needs, has to begin to take hold, along with a critical/communicative approach to 
233 Innes, and Booher, Planning with Complexity, 5. 
234 Ibid.  
235 Ibid.  
236 Ibid.  
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why and how homeland security dollars are spent. This author believes that such an 
approach begins with the development of an informed, reporting, and just culture. 
The nation must begin to rely on the ability of local residents to be effective public 
citizens. To engage and empower citizens successfully, a homeland security culture must 
develop that is (1) an informed culture in which the individual citizen has an understanding 
of what constitutes homeland security and the knowledge of the risks and costs associated 
with existing programs and efforts, (2) a reporting culture in which the local government 
is reporting on the progress of homeland security initiatives, and (3) a just culture in which 
citizens believe they are receiving an adequate ROI. Such a culture is necessary to prepare 
citizens for their involvement in crowdfunding and bonding efforts. 
1. Informed Culture 
To develop an informed culture and ensure citizens understand the factors that 
affect homeland security, communication, and meaningful engagement need to occur 
between the individual citizens and public safety officials. By sharing information on 
homeland security programs, policies, costs, and initiatives, public safety officials provide 
a platform to educate individuals. This may be done in a variety of ways such as convening 
forums, developing brochures, responding to correspondence, and posting information on 
websites.237 
Public safety officials need to get out from behind their desks and engage the 
community in homeland security discussions at all types of public forums.238 It would be 
an interesting scenario if every little league baseball game were to start with a reminder of 
the phone number to call about suspicious activity within the neighborhood or what to 
prepare in case of a power outage. The beginning of every school year could start with a 
security briefing to parents on what happens when a school goes into lockdown. When a 
resident purchases a new home, a local public safety official might call with a 
237 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2011), 5. 
238 Robert Bach, and Kaufman, David, “A Social Infrastructure for Homeland Security: Advancing the 
Homeland Security Paradigm,” Homeland Security Affairs 5, no. 2 (May 2009).  
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neighborhood welcome, a review of key critical infrastructure within the community, and 
a reminder to report any suspicious activities around the key infrastructure. With measures 
like these, over time, the individual citizen would become more informed, and an informed 
culture would be developed within the community. 
Such a strategy was utilized by Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
(WMATA) in the development of its new safety culture after a train crashed killing nine 
people in June 2009. This accident revealed numerous safety concerns throughout 
WMATA. Employees were ill-informed regarding basic safety measures.239 To begin to 
develop an informed culture within WMATA, the general manager mandated that all 
meetings, no matter what the topic, begin with a safety tip. The general manager also began 
producing a weekly newsletter that included safety lessons. By incorporating this strategy 
for over three years, employees became more informed of safety issues, and the number of 
employee accidents dramatically declined.240 
2. Reporting Culture 
Reporting the success or failure of homeland security initiatives could be 
accomplished by having states and local governments utilize MBRA to develop a long-
term homeland security strategy and continue to report the reduction in risk and/or 
vulnerabilities for a vast network of assets in a community.241 Every community in the 
nation must report its annual budget to residents so they understand how their tax dollars 
enhance the community; this type of reporting needs to exist for homeland security 
expenditures as well. 
239 National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority Metrorail Trains near Fort Totten Station (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety 
Board, 2009).  
240 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Safety and Security Committee, Safety Report, 
(Washington, DC: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 2011). 
241 Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security, 107. 
 75 
                                                 
3. Just Culture 
To create a just culture, the public must weigh the reduction in risk against the 
potential offset of making a small contribution to protect a community’s infrastructure. If 
the public believes that such an ROI is acceptable, then and only then will America truly 
begin becoming a safer and more secure nation. 
The Natural Hazards Center in Boulder, Colorado states: 
Local leaders must define a vision of the future, provide the direction to get 
there, and establish the priorities to make it happen. They must develop and 
create a will that is infectious among community politicians and 
constituents alike. Disaster recovery managers must juxtapose short-term 
and long-term community needs against the quick-and-easy fix or the 
perceived rights of select property owners. They must protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of the community from the desires, power, and influence 
of those who promote short-sighted solutions. They need to foster personal 
and community responsibility for recovery decisions that will affect their 
community for years to come. 
The conventional homeland security grant-funding construct (determining 
associated threats, calculating risks, and understanding public safety needs) must be 
reconsidered if states and localities are going to maintain their current level of capabilities 
and continue to build resilient communities. Crafting short- and long-term homeland 
security budgets, calculating ROIs, and engaging the public allows for a more rigorous 
evaluation of homeland security needs and delineates where the public is willing to spend 
time and money. The processes for determining an ROI and mechanisms for engaging the 
public in funding decisions create the opportunity for citizens—area residents—to 
determine the levels of need and want for continued security in their own communities. To 
those ends, this thesis offers a rigorous yet contemporary, multi-approach experiment in 
legitimizing homeland security spending. 
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APPENDIX.  CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS AS 
DEFINED BY DHS 
1. Chemical Sector 
2. Government Facilities Sector 
3. Communications Sector 
4. Critical Manufacturing Sector 
5. Dams Sector 
6. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector 
7. Emergency Services Sector 
8. Energy Sector 
9. Financial Services Sector 
10. Food and Agricultural Sector 
11. Government Facilities Sector 
12. Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
13. Information Technology Sector 
14. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector 
15. Transportation Sector 
16. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector 
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